Hongera Bi. Elsie Kanza, mshauri wa Uchumi wa Rais Kikwete!

[Nyani Ngabu]

Nilikuwa najiuliza sana kwanini JK alisema hajui kwanini nchi yake ni masikini. Majibu yameanza kupatikana na moja ya jibu ni hili la huyu mmama maana si kijana, tena naamin haijui Tanzania vizuri na sidhani kama alisoma zile shule zetu za kuwahi namba ukiwa na kidumu cha maji na ufagio na mwendo wa kukopa visheti kwa walimu

Wewe unajua kwa nini Tanzania ni maskini?

 

[kweleakwelea]

wazungu ni washenzi sana...

1. walimwita jk akaamue mambo ya ivory coast ilhali wakijua karig uchaguzi

2. wakamwita jk akatoe mada juu ya usimamizi wa maliasili paris ilhali wakijua kashindwa

3. wanampa huyu dada tuzo ilhali wakijua ndio muuza nchi...ole wetu.....

ona hawa wahindi wanavyostukia theory zao...

Ricardo’s Fallacy:
Mutual Benefit From Trade Based On Comparative Costs And Specialization?

Utsa Patnaik


The Ricardian theory of comparative advantage contains a logical fallacy when used to argue that mutual benefit necessarily results from trade. Ricardo's two-country, two-commodity model assumes that both goods can be produced in both countries. It is then shown that even if unit production cost is lower for both goods in one country compared to the other, provided the relative cost of production differs it would be of mutual benefit for each country to specialize in the good in which it has lower relative cost and exchange with each other. The benefit arises from an actual physical increase in total output owing to specialization, such that for each country there is vector-wise improvement in the consumption of the two goods through exchange, that is a higher level of one for at least the same level of the other, in the post-trade situation compared to the pre-trade one.
For example, taking the two goods as cloth and wine following Ricardo's own famous example, let us assume that country B has higher unit cost than country A in both goods, for it requires 4 and 2.5 person-days respectively to produce a unit of cloth and a unit of wine, while Country A requires only 2 and 1 person-days respectively to produce a unit of cloth and a unit of wine. Ricardo assumes full employment: the total available daily person-days in A, say 200 person-days, can produce daily either a total of 100 units of cloth or a total of 200 units of wine, which defines the linear transformation frontier of cloth for wine, and every combination of these two goods on that frontier can be actually produced. Similarly B, with say 400 total person-days available, can produce daily either a total of 100 units of cloth or a total of 160 units of wine, with every combination on the frontier so defined also

Table 1. A Numerical Example Illustrating:
A)"Comparative Advantage" when Ricardo's assumption is satisfied,
B) The undefinability of comparative advantage when Ricardo's Assumption is not satisfied.

A): Ricardo's assumption is satisfied and both Countries A and B can produce good x (cloth) as well as good y (wine). A is assumed to have higher productivity in both goods than B, and total person days available is assumed to be 200 in A and 400 in B.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Person Days per Unit Output Pre-Trade Output/Consumption
Good A B A B A +B
_________________________________________________________________________________
One unit Cloth ( x) 2 4 50 50 100
One unit Wine (y) 1 2.5 100 80 180
________________________________________________________________________________
After Specialization Post Trade Consumption
Output in Units per Day
A B A + B A B A + B
Cloth (x 0 100 100 50 50 100
Wine (y 200 0 200 110 90 200
_________________________________________________________________________________
Result: Both countries are vector-wise better off in post-trade situation.

B) Ricardo's assumption is not satisfied. Country B cannot produce good y, only good x, while Country A can produce both goods x and y
_________________________________________________________________________________
Person days per Unit Output Pre-trade Output/Consumption
Good A B A B A + B
_________________________________________________________________________________
One unit cloth (x) 2 4 50 100 150
One unit wine (y) 1 … 100 0 100
_________________________________________________________________________________
Output After Specialization by A Post- Trade Consumption
A B A +B A B A +B
Cloth (x 0 100 100 50 50 100
Wine (y 200 0 200 100 100 200
________________________________________________________________________________

Result: Total output of the two commodities does not, and cannot, increase vector wise unlike in the previous case. Country B's consumption is diversified but the availability of commodities there does not, and cannot, increase vector-wise unlike in the previous case. Country A is not necessarily better off vector-wise after specialization and trade (as the example shows), though it could be. (However if land constraint prevails, in A, it would a) either prevent A from increasing sufficiently the output of y, such that A would necessarily experience unemployment created by x-displacing trade; or b) if output of y is increased, given land constraint that of non-traded crops like food would fall. As regards B, if Ricardo's assumption of initial full employment is not fulfilled, then in the post-trade situation, the production and export of cloth by B in additionto its domestic consumption would increase employment there. B in such a case would have both diversified its consumption and increased its employment. All these asymmetric effects however are a far cry from the Ricardian picture of necessary mutual benefit from trade).


being producible. (B is assumed to have 400 person-days to A's 200 so that the total output size in the two countries is roughly similar).
In the initial pre-trade situation, if A produces, say, a combination of 50 units of cloth and 100 units of wine, and B produces a combination of 50 units of cloth and 80 units of wine, then the total output taking both countries together is 100 units of cloth and 180 units of wine. (These particular numbers embodying the assumption that each country devotes half its resources to each good, have no significance and any other feasible combination would do equally well). Relative disadvantage is clearly less for B in producing cloth where it incurs double A's unit cost, while for wine it incurs more than double A's unit cost. A's relative advantage is greater in producing wine. Ricardo's cleverness lay in arguing that if B specialized completely in cloth in which its relative disadvantage was less, and A specialized in wine in which its relative advantage was more, total output taking both countries would increase, and this increased output could be shared through exchange making both countries better off. Thus after specialization, B would produce 100 units of cloth alone and A would produce 200 units of wine alone, and total output of wine would be therefore higher by 20 units compared to 180 in the pre-trade situation, with total output of cloth unchanged. The extra 20 units of wine could be shared, say with A retaining 110 units of wine and exchanging 90 units with B for 50 units of cloth. Thus each country after trade would have a higher level of consumption of wine, by 10 units, for the same level of consumption of cloth, 50 units, compared to the pre-specialization and trade situation (Table A1).
The exact ratio in which the sharing will take place has been the subject of much discussion, but need not detain us here. All we have to note is that mutual benefit from sharing higher output is put forward as both the reason that specialization and exchange is undertaken, and as the actual outcome of specialization and exchange. Ricardo put this forward as a perfectly general argument for explaining all trade, and mentioned no exceptions whatsoever. Extremely clever though it is, the argument is based on a fallacy, which relates to the sphere of applied logic.
A fallacy in an argument can arise either when the process of reasoning, to draw an inference from the given premise is not correct, or when the assumption (the premise) of the argument is not true. Fallacies can be of various kinds - material fallacies arise from an incorrect statement of facts, verbal fallacies from an incorrect use of terms and formal fallacies from an incorrect process of inference. Ricardo's process of reasoning is valid, but the fallacy arises because his assumption or premise is not true for a general theory of trade. There is a serious problem with the assumption, which is that both goods are producible and indeed are actually produced, in both countries. Only on this assumption can the shifting of resources from one good to the other, hence the transformation of one good into the other be postulated. Ricardo's argument is applicable only to countries with a similar production structure, where the assumption of the model holds, that both countries can produce both goods. It becomes an inapplicable argument when considering tradebetween temperate advanced countries and tropical developing countries; because such trade involves goods which cannot ever be produced at all in temperate regions and for which cost of production and transformation frontiers cannot even be defined. This fallacy, which tacitly assumes a special case -both goods producible in both countries- and argues to a conclusion -mutual benefit- which is presented as being of general relevance, is a well-known type of fallacy that, following Aristotle, has long been categorized by logicians as the 'converse fallacy of accident' under secundum quid. More fully, "A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid" or the fallacy of accident, when an argument applies a general rule to a case where some special circumstance ('accident') makes the rule inapplicable…. The converse fallacy of accident argues improperly from a special case to a general rule. The fact that a certain drug is beneficial to some sick persons does not imply that it is beneficial to all men." (Encyclopaedia Britannica,11, 28.).
What is the "cost of production" in Germany of tea and coffee, or in UK of natural rubber and sugarcane? How can the transformation frontier between machinery and coffee be defined for Germany, or that between cloth and natural rubber be defined for Britain? None of the tropical goods can be produced under field conditions in cold temperate countries, hence neither costs nor transformation frontiers can be defined. Indeed the specific example Ricardo himself gave involving cloth and wine production in England and Portugal, is itself a highly problematic one. Warm temperate Portugal could produce not only wool for cloth, but large supplies of grapes for making wine on a commercial basis, while cold temperate England could produce wool for cloth but not grapes (vitis vinifra) under field conditions. This was particularly true during the 14th to 18th centuries when mean summer temperatures in Britain were lower than they are today, and genetic modification of plants was unknown. The northern limit of grape growing is defined by a mean July isotherm of 19 degrees Celsius or 66 degrees Fahrenheit. As Adam Smith had remarked, grapes could only be grown against artificially heated walls in Britain, and wine made from them, at a preposterously higher unit cost compared to foreign imported wines (Smith 1776, 1: 423-24). Grapes were not grown in Britain on a commercial basis for wine production-- although sometimes individual landed aristocrats showed off their great wealth by maintaining hot houses at enormous expense to supply their own tables with the fruit, as contemporary novels indicate (Austen 1994).
Ricardo fudges his argument in his chapter on Trade, by failing to distinguish between production of the agricultural raw material, and processing of the raw material. It is not possible that he did not know the distinction between the two. He says the following:
" Now suppose that England were to discover a process for making wine, so that it should become her interest to grow it rather than import it, she would naturally divert a portion of her capital from the foreign trade to the home trade; she would cease to manufacture cloth for exportation and would grow wine for herself." (Ricardo 1986: 137. Emphasis added).
Ricardo goes on to say:
" If the improvement in making wine were of a very important description, it might become profitable for the two countries to exchange employments, for England to make all the wine and Portugal all the cloth consumed by them." (Ricardo 1986: 138. Emphasis added).
The repeated use of the term "grow wine" by Ricardo is highly significant. By using this phrase, the activity of growing grapes and the altogether different activity of processing grapes into wine, are telescoped together into a single activity by Ricardo, and thereby the crucial distinction between these two activities is conceptually obliterated. Growing a crop is contingent on climate, whereas processing it is not. Indeed the very first sentence quoted above suggests that, for Ricardo, "a process for making wine" is the same as to "grow wine". Ricardo gets hopelessly enmeshed here in untenable concepts. An argument based on ambiguity of language is a verbal fallacy. The material fallacy (both countries produce both goods) is here supported and compounded by a verbal fallacy. The premise is stated by Ricardo in a verbally ambiguous form which gives the misleading impression that it is a general premise -- that 'growing wine' whatever that may mean, by England is as possible as 'growing wine' by Portugal. In fact, a country can no more "grow wine" than it can "grow cloth" or "grow shoes". It has to produce the raw material -- grapes in the first case, wool in the second and leather in the third -- before it can process the raw material into wine, cloth and shoes respectively. While Portugal could both produce wool and produce grapes, and therefore could make both cloth and wine, England could produce wool but not grapes, and therefore could make cloth but not grape-wine. The transformation frontier of cloth to wine could be defined for Portugal, but not for England.
Since the untenability of the Ricardian assumption, is true even for a warm temperate primary good like grapes, its untenability is true a fortiori for the purely tropical traded primary goods such as cane sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, jute, indigo, opium, rubber, tropical hardwoods like teak, mahogany and rosewood, cereals like rice, tropical fruits and vegetables, palm oil and the many other goods, which could never be produced under field conditions in cold temperate Europe or North America.
Joan Robinson was entirely correct in saying that Ricardo's model ruled out "the whole of what Adam Smith regarded as the main sphere of trade -- exchanges between town and country, that is, between manufactures and primary products" (Robinson, 1975: 130). But she was surely not as correct when, pointing out that Ricardo's objective was to make a case against protection, she went on to say that "Modern exponents of free-trade theory do not hesitate to apply its dogmas to producers of primary products, but in fact it has nothing to do with their problems." (Robinson, 1975: 130, emphasis added). On the contrary, it has everything to do with their problems: we know that the case against protection was actuated by Britain's imperative need to import freely precisely those vital primary products, serving as wage -goods or as raw materials, which it could not produce enough of (corn, hemp) or could not produce at all (tobacco, sugar, raw cotton, hardwoods, dyestuffs etc.). It is no use trying to absolve Ricardo's theory of its link with trade based on extra-economic compulsion; the Free Trade agitation he championed was not other countries' freedom to export their manufactures (Ricardo is not on record as opposing existing high English tariffs on Asian textiles), but only Britain's freedom to import food and raw materials unhindered by local landlord interests or any other monopoly interests like the old chartered trading companies.
The "free trade dogma" applied to dependent or colonized primary producers is not a modern invention as Joan Robinson seems to suggest: it was Ricardo's theory which initiated the dogma, via his process of reasoning to a general conclusion using a specific premise, without a word of qualification regarding that premise. The fallacious but convenient conclusion of necessary mutual benefit from free trade, represented the interests of his country, the dominant trading and colonizing country of the time. We can visualize Ricardo, like any other civilized gentleman in England at that time, drinking a cup of Caribbean slave-labour produced coffee sweetened with cane sugar while smoking tobacco, with a carafe of grape wine at his side -- none of these four goods being producible in Britain -- and wearing a shirt made from cotton -- a raw material not producible in his country -- while engaged in writing at a polished mahogany table- a wood not producible in Britain -- in order to formulate his allegedly 'general' model of trade which assumed that "both goods are produced in both countries," with not a word of qualification regarding the limited domain of relevance of the assumption.
Wherever the Ricardian assumption does not hold, the Ricardian conclusion about mutual benefit from trade, does not hold either. Where country B cannot domestically produce the good y it wishes to consume, then its exporting a part of the only good, x, that it can produce, to country A which can produce both goods x and y but is made to specialize in y, does not raise total output, does not raise consumption vector-wise in both countries, and mutual benefit does not follow.
Continuing with the example in Table 1, suppose that country B (Britain) cannot produce grape wine, hence in the pre-trade situation, it produces only cloth to the extent of 100 units by devoting all its available labour to it. Country A (Portugal) however produces 50 units of cloth and 100 units of wine as before. Relative costs and hence relative advantage cannot be defined, for we have three cost terms but not the fourth. In the pre-trade situation, taking both countries the total output of cloth is 150 units and the total output of wine is 100 units. Suppose by some extra-economic means (for there is no a priori economic reason for Portugal to specialize), Britain induces Portugal to stop producing 50 units of cloth and specialize entirely in producing 200 units of wine. Britain then trades 50 units of its own cloth output, for, say 100 units of wine from Portugal. In the post- specialization trade situation, taking both countries, total output of cloth has gone down by 50 units while total output of wine has gone up by 100 units, hence there is no vector wise increase in total output -- this is the crucial difference from the first case and it rules out mutual benefit.
Portugal is not necessarily better off: it may continue to consume 50 units of cloth and 100 units of wine, the same as its pre-trade combination, as shown in the example. Britain has diversified its consumption basket from one to two goods, while maintaining total cloth output at the pre-trade level But Britain too is not better off and cannot be better off as regards consumption in the Ricardian vector-wise sense, (more of one good for no less of the other) for it does have to give up consuming 50 of its 100 units of cloth, in exchange for 100 units of wine, as long the assumption of full employment is retained.
Suppose however we drop the assumption of full employment: in the pre-trade situation Britain devotes only half its available daily person-days to produce 50 units of cloth because it can consume no more than 50 units, and the remaining 200 person-days remain unemployed. Then if it induces Portugal to specialize in wine production, it can expand its own cloth output to 100 units and trade 50 units of these for 100 units of wine. This would mean a vector-wise improvement in output and consumption for Britain. If we postulate a land-constraint in Portugal, than total wine/grape output may not increase to the required extent and de-industrialization necessarily involves unemployment of cloth workers not fully absorbed into wine production; or, if wine output hence grape output does increase to absorb all labour displaced from cloth production, then there is both de-industrialization and, given the land constraint, there might be decline in the output of non-traded crops like food grains.
Exchange of English woollen cloth for Portuguese wine had been actually taking place for over a century before Ricardo wrote, but the reason did not lie in "comparative advantage," which could not even be defined. In reality a supply of Portuguese wine in partial exchange for English cloth was procured through Britain's successful mercantilist policies of attaining naval dominance, sealed by the 1703 Treaty of Methuen whose provisions established English traders in Lisbon and Oporto with commercial privileges and opened up "the spectacular increase in the importation of English cloth and other exports into Portugal, whence the bulk of them were re-exported to Brazil, and of Portuguese wines into Great Britain….." (Boxer 1973: 170). There was a growing trade surplus for Britain vis a vis Portugal, settled by inflow of Luso-Brazilian gold, which gladdened mercantilist hearts. In the post-trade situation Portugal was de-industrialized to the extent of its mandatory cloth imports from Britain, while Britons diversified their consumption basket by accessing wine they could not themselves produce and at the same time, increased their manufacturing output, to the extent of exports, beyond domestic absorption. Improvement did not and could not take place for both countries, only for the one that was militarily and politically the more powerful. In fact an actual welfare worsening is very much on the cards for the country that is obliged, owing to extra economic pressures, to specialize as a primary goods exporter. To the extent that it faces a land constraint, increasing the output of primary traded crops very commonly has an adverse impact on availability of non-traded crops like domestically consumed food grains, and undermines nutrition levels of its population, as we have demonstrated elsewhere (Patnaik, 2003). It would be interesting to investigate what happened to the non-traded food grains crops in Portugal as its wine exports increased.
It might be argued, from the quotations from Ricardo given earlier in which he speaks of "process of making wine " and "improvements in making wine" which might make it profitable for England to make wine, that Ricardo was stressing technology leading to processing efficiency, so that that whether a country could actually grow the primary raw material or not was simply not relevant for him, because in his (implicit) view it could always import the raw material, and provided it used superior technology it would be able to process it at lower cost than the country of origin of the raw material. The obvious example is imported raw cotton processed into machine made cloth in England and again exported. (Note that grapes, cited in the example of wine that Ricardo used, are too perishable for even this "import-and -process" argument to hold).
However, this technology argument with raw cotton and cloth raises its own deep problems: Britain only succeeded in making a technological breakthrough in cotton cloth production under a heavily protectionist regime, which was more prolonged than any protectionist regime ever seen in history. Beginning in 1700, for 75 years there was a legal blanket ban, enforced through heavy fines, on the sale and consumption of all pure cotton printed and painted fabrics that were wholly imported from India and Persia (Mantoux 1970: 200-201; Davis 1966, 1979). The lifting of this blanket ban on consumption, followed Arkwright's successful application to Parliament in 1774 arguing that there should be no legal bar to sale and consumption of the new, domestically produced machine -made pure cotton goods (Mantoux 1970: 224-25). The granting of his demand by Parliament that amended the relevant Act, was combined with maintaining even more rigorously, the barriers to importing printed cotton goods from Asia for domestic use.
"No protection could be more complete, for it gave the manufacturers a real monopoly of the home market." (Mantoux 1970: 256). Between 1787 and 1813 the import tariffs were raised from 16.5% to 85% ad valorem for calicoes and from 18% to 44% for muslins, all during Ricardo's own lifetime, because many categories of these Asian hand woven fabrics stubbornly remained cheaper even taking landed cost, than English machine made cloth as late as 1813 [1]. These duties were reduced over time as unit production costs of machine made yarn and cloth fell further after 1820 (two tables of tariffs and duties on Asian cloth up to 1832 are given in Dutt 1970: 203) [2] but they still lasted for 70 years after 1775, the last tariffs not going until 1846. Conversely the Asian colonies, like all others colonies, were compulsorily and completely trade liberalized throughout the period.
So abnormal was this prolonged, 150 -year regime of metropolitan protectionism and colonial managed free trade, that one can hardly put it forward as an example of Ricardian "neutral" technological advantage working quite independently of political power. Incidentally, most leading historians of Britain's Industrial Revolution (P. Deane and W.A.Cole 1969, E.J.Hobsbawm 1969) and historians of technical change in cotton textiles (D. S.Landes 1970 ), blandly ignore the economic effects of 150 years of protectionism in the form of import bans followed by high tariffs. Yet the import ban on Asian textiles lasting for three-quarters of a century, must have greatly raised the profitability of potential import substitution, and provided the temporal climate conducive to the repeated, often abortive experiments with technical innovations, which produced workable machines decades after they were first initiated (thirty years passed between the first experimental spinning jenny of 1735 and the Hargreaves jenny of 1765). The history of prolonged British protectionism against lower-cost Asian textiles is also ignored completely in their papers - there is not a single reference to the matter either in text or index - by the historians of Asia writing in the Cambridge Economic History of India (1984) [3] who imitatively follow their mentors' biased analysis of the subject. They attribute the decline of Indian cotton manufactures exports to Britain followed by rise in primary exports like raw cotton, to Ricardian 'comparative advantage' - fallaciously as we have seen, since comparative cost could not be defined at all for Britain which could not produce raw cotton - and they make no reference at all to Britain's systematic commercial policy excluding competition in manufactured goods. The Ricardian fallacy has cast a long shadow and continues to subvert correct analysis nearly two centuries after it was first formulated.
The "technology" route for rescuing Ricardo does not work. The fatal flaw in his theory remains. Rather than confronting the fallacy in Ricardo's argument arising from its untenable assumption that both goods are produced in both countries, modern mainstream theory too has tried to hide it by ignoring it altogether. Paul Samuelson in his paper titled "Market mechanisms and Maximization"(Samuelson 1970) discusses Ricardo's model of comparative cost in linear programming terms. Samuelson continues to treat it as a general theory, and ignores its limited applicability arising from the crucial assumption of both countries producing both goods. Fudging the argument is continued, but in a different manner. Without discussing his reason for doing so, Samuelson substitutes "food" for the "wine" of Ricardo's example in both the diagram and the text, while retaining unchanged the other good, cloth. Since "food" can be produced in both England and Portugal, the immediate logical problem with Ricardo's own example is overcome.
But such silent fudging does not do away with the real-life problem, that a very large segment of world trade, simply does not fit into the assumption of the model, which therefore is not a general theory of trade as is claimed. Having altered Ricardo's own example, and thereby shown that he understood the problem, Samuelson should have mentioned why the comparative cost theory with its "mutual benefit" conclusion, could not be applied to trade between countries which have qualitatively different output vectors -- in particular, to trade between advanced countries and developing tropical countries. But such a conclusion would go against the entire thrust of modern normative trade theory, whose proposition on "free trade" being necessarily beneficial for all parties, is such a useful rationalization for continuing to pursue trade policies which are in reality welfare-enhancing for advanced countries at the expense of welfare reduction for developing countries.
The longevity of the fallacious comparative advantage theory as a general theory of trade, is to be understood, we believe, in terms of the important apologetic function it continues to play in the modern world. By positing necessary mutual benefit from all trade without exception -- thereby tacitly including trade between advanced countries and developing countries -- the theory helps to intellectually rationalize and justify, all those past and present actually existing trade patterns which have been in fact the outcome of the asymmetric exercise of economic and political power, and which have served to widen the economic distance between nations. Generations of teachers of economics in both the advanced and the developing countries have taught an incorrect theory, and generations of intelligent students have uncritically reproduced this incorrect theory, in our assessment, largely owing to their subjection to the intellectual hegemony exercised by conservative Northern mainstream theory. These fallacious arguments have been criticized by a very few, individual exceptions to the rule of uncritical advocacy of generalized free trade.[4]

REFERENCES

AUSTEN, J., 1994 Pride and Prejudice (Wordsworth Classics)

BARAN, P., 1973, The Political Economy of Growth (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books)

BOXER, C.R., 1973, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415-1825 ( Harmondsworth: Pelican Books)

CHAUDHURI, K. N. 1984 "Foreign trade and the Balance of Payments" in The Cambridge Economic History of India Vo.2 c. 1757 - c. 1970, edited by Dharma Kumar with the editorial assistance of M. Desai.

DAVIS, R., 1966, "The Rise of Protection in England 1689-1786" Economic History Review 2nd Series, 19, 306-17.

DAVIS, R. 1979, The Industrial Revolution and British Oversea Trade (Leicester: Leicester University Press)

DEANE, P., and COLE, W.A., 1969 British Economic Growth 1688-1959 -- Trends and Structure (2nd edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

HOBSBAWM, E..J., 1969, Industry and Empire ( Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).

KUMAR, D. (Edited, with the editorial assistance of M. Desai ), 1984, The Cambridge Economic History of India Vol.2, c.1757 -c.1970 (Delhi: Orient Longman in association with Cambridge University Press).

DUTT, R.C., 1970, The Economic History of India Vol. 1- Under Early British Rule 1757-1837. (New Delhi: Publications Division, Govt. of India. Reprinted by arrangement with Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 1984 edition, Macropaedia Vol 11.

FRANK, A. G., 1971, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books)

LANDES, D. S., 1969, The unbound Prometheus: Technological change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).,

MANTOUX, P., 1970 The Industrial Revolution in the 18th Century (London: Methuen. First published in Marjorie Vernon's English translation in 1928, London: Cape).

MORRIS, D. M. 1984 "The Growth of large scale industry to 1947" in The Cambridge Economic History of India vol.2 c.1757 - c.1970 edited by Dharma Kumar with the editorial assistance of M. Desai.

PATNAIK, U., 1984 "Tribute Transfer and the Balance of Payments in the Cambridge Economic History of India Vol.11", Social Scientist, 12,12, reprinted in U.Patnaik, 1999, The Long Transition - Essays on Political Economy ( Delhi: Tulika).

PATNAIK, U., 2003, "On the inverse relation between primary exports and food absorption in developing countries under liberalized trade regimes' in J. Ghosh and C. P. Chandrasekhar (Eds) Work and Welfare in the Age of Finance (Delhi: Tulika)

RICARDO, D., 1986, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation , Vol.1 of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo edited by Pierro Sraffa with the collaboration of M H Dobb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

ROBINSON, J. V., 1975, Collected Economic Papers, Vol. V (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

SAMUELSON, P. A., 1970, "Market mechanisms and Maximization", The Collected Scientific Papers of P A Samuelson (New Delhi : Oxford and IBH)

SMITH, A., 1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Editd E.Cannan, 3rd edition, 1922 (London: Methuen).

_______________
This paper has been published under the same title in Jomo K S Ed., The Pioneers of Development Economics Delhi: Tulika 2005

[1] E. Baines, History of the Cotton Manufactures in Great Britain, quoted in Mantoux 1970: 256, fn.3).

[2] from the Minutes of Evidence &c., On the Affairs of the East India Company (1813: 153), quoted by H H Wilson in James Mill, History of India, Wilson's Continuation Book 1 Ch..vii.

[3] Notably, Morris D. Morris and K.N, Chaudhuri. For a brief critique of the analysis in the Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol.2, see Patnaik 1984.

[4] Our list may not be complete, but among writers since 1950, would include Ralph Davis (1979), Joan V. Robinson (1975), Paul Baran (1973), and Andre Gunder Frank (1971).



Waweza jisomea pia jinsi wnavyomanipulate situations na measurements kuonekana kuwa kuna progress THEORIZING FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORMS by Prof. UTSA PATNAIK au the THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGER......by Prof. UTSA PATNAIK

YOU CAN ALSO SEE NI jinsi gani wachina walianza kushtukia athari za imported capital toka marekani wakati sisi tunazitafuta kila kukicha...kuna kazi za professor wang zinzeleza mambo mengi ya aina hiyo.......

sisi twafa!

 

[Leornado]

Tanzania tuzo zinapendekezwa through Technical know who nasio technical know how.

Bi Elsi knows JK....

Tutajibeba tusie mjua mtu serikalini, hata kama ujuzi unao kama huna channel imekula kwako, vyeti vyako vitaozea stoo.

 

[Gagurito]

Huyo bint duh? Atakuwa ni fisadi tu! Ajitahidi kumshauri mr president vyema! Dah! Vyuo vyenye majina ya kizungu au nchi za nje km US, UK vinasumbua watoto wa wakulima kweli, cjui mwenzendu wa Sebastian kisanje na Makumila watachukuliwaje!

 

[Prof Griff]

Siku hizi mzee kuna e-thesis hasa marekani huwa wanaziweka thesis za wanafunzi wao wote online. Na mtandao ni kiboko muulize waziri wa Ujerumani kilimkuta nini alipophotocopy kazi ya mtu. Vilevile kwani iwe tabu kupatikana? Mbona Joseph Stiglitz ukiandika unapata kazi yake? Tuseme yeye sio academician by career je huko wizarani na BOT tupatieni CV yake.

Anza wewe. Tutafutie degree ya Economics ya Kikwete kutoka UDSM tuchambue knowledge yake ya "Quadrative Equation Pro-Analysis", Micro-megaeconomics", "Macro-metaeconomics", "Megalomaniacnomics" na upupu mwingine.

 

[Masanja]

Acheni ushabiki na hoja mbofumbofu jamani. Mbona hamuulizi Williams College ina hadhi gani mmeng'ngania USIU-A tu?

Kubobea kwenye taaluma ya uchumi siyo hoja vilevile: Larry Summers, mmoja wa Wataaluma wa juu kabisa Marekani wa mambo ya Uchumi, na Msomi wa kuotea mbali aliyewahi kuwa Mkuu wa Chuo cha Harvard mbona alijuzulu cheo cha Mshauri Mkuu wa Uchumi wa Obama mwaka jana? Hakuna la maana alilomsaidia Obama, na uchumi wa Marekani bado unadidimia kila kukicha.

You must be a joker kumfananisha Larry Summers na hawa ndugu zako! Hebu naomba nisiongee sana. Nenda Harvard usome profile ya Mr. Summers na mambo ambayo aliyafanya kuanzia alivyokuwa Chief Economist wa World Bank mpaka Clinton akamchukua kurith nafasi ya Rubin pale Treasury. He is an accomplished Brain!

Kuhusu huyu dada simjui, lakini naona shule yake siyo mbaya. Maana Williams College is a decent school. Sijui kama amepublish chochote tuone skills zake katika field yake. I think we can know her through her publications (if she has any) maana kama ni kumshauri JK kwenye uchumi ni dhahiri kabisa..a lot needs to be done. All in all, she deserves some credits, after all waliompa hiyo heshima hawakumuokota barabarani..wametumia vigezo ambavyo wanavijua wao.

 

[Prof Griff]

You must be a joker kumfananisha Larry Summers na hawa ndugu zako! Hebu naomba nisiongee sana. Nenda Harvard usome profile ya Mr. Summers na mambo ambayo aliyafanya kuanzia alivyokuwa Chief Economist wa World Bank mpaka Clinton akamchukua kurith nafasi ya Rubin pale Treasury. He is an accomplished Brain!

You appear to have missed my point altogether, lakini sioni haja ya kujirudiarudia.

 

[Papaeliopaulos]

Mkuu katika kutengeneza economic policy ya nchi inafaa uwe umeshiba vizuri uchumi na kufahamu kwani inategemea zaidi na mazingira ya nchi husika.

Ukitazama CV ya huyu amesoma Bsc ya Business Administration ambapo sidhani kama kuna uchumi humo au zaidi litakuwa ni somo moja la uchumi. Inawezekana ikawa Microeconomics, kwenye macro hawagusi hawa. Vilevile mshauri anatakiwa awe amebobea katika fani husika ili awe na scenarios mbali mbali katika kumshauri rais.

Sasa maswali ni je Tanzania hakuna wachumi waliobobea? Pili ameandika wapi au kufanya kazi gani za uchumi kuonyesha na yeye amebobea?

Kwa mtazamo wangu nadhani wamemchukua makusudi ili kwenda kuionyesha jamii ya kimataifa kinachozimaliza nchi za kiafrika kiuchumi hasa Tz ni nini. Maana Duniani, Afrika tunaheshimika kwa kujaaliwa rasilimali nyingi za kila aina na Mwenyezi Mungu, ila tunadharaulika kwa umaskini uliokithiri. sasa kuna watu huko wanaumiza vichwa kujaribu kijua Tatizo ni nini? Kama Raisi Hajui kwa nini watu wake ni maskini, halafu mshauri wake kuhusu mambo ya uchumi si Mchumi tayari wanaweza kupata majibu wakiwalinganisha na watu wa nchi nyingine. Wakati mwingine hawamchukui kwa sifa zake , wanamteua kwa udhaifu wake ukilinganisha na nafasi yake ili akawe kielelezo.

 

[punainen-red]

Kitu kimoja tu, I can guess huo ushauri/usaidizi kwa mkwere anaufanyia wapi!!!!!!

 

[Masanja]

You appear to have missed my point altogether, lakini sioni haja ya kujirudiarudia.

Mkuu, yes ume-acknowldge intellectual prowess ya Summers. Lakini ukashindwa kusema kwamba Summers aliondoka WH kurudi Harvard kusudi Tenure yake isiwe severed. Maana anapenda bado kuwa mwalimu na kama angeendelea kuwa WH basi kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba kibarua chake kikaisha..pale Cambridge. Na bado narudia..kutoa mfano wa Summers na huyu dada..it was an erroneous comparison. Atleast from my humble understanding.

 

[Prof Griff]

Mkuu, yes ume-acknowldge intellectual prowess ya Summers. Lakini ukashindwa kusema kwamba Summers aliondoka WH kurudi Harvard kusudi Tenure yake isiwe severed. Maana anapenda bado kuwa mwalimu na kama angeendelea kuwa WH basi kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba kibarua chake kikaisha..pale Cambridge. Na bado narudia..kutoa mfano wa Summers na huyu dada..it was an erroneous comparison. Atleast from my humble understanding.

Supposedly so (as you claim) lakini nobody's buying into that kind of crappy excuse. What's more important: finishing the tasks he had masterminded of fixing the US economy, or saving his tenureship at Harvard? Ukweli ni kwamba kashindwa kazi, maji aliona marefu sababu policies zake hazikuleta mafanikio aliyotarajia. Isitoshe, Wasomi wenzake wote nao waliachia ngazi, na hata huyo replacement wake, Gene Spetling siyo
Mchumi kitaaluma.

 

[Prof Griff]

Supposedly so (so says you) lakini nobody's buying into that kind of crappy excuse. What's more important for his professional and academic legacy: finishing the policies he had masterminded of fixing the US economy, or saving his tenureship at Harvard? Kumbe he's only good at talkin' the talk kama Obama: kashindwa kazi, maji aliona marefu sababu policies zake hazikuleta mafanikio aliyotarajia. Isitoshe, Wasomi wenzake waliobobea nao waliachia ngazi, na hata huyo replacement wake, Gene Spelling siyo Mchumi kitaaluma.

 

[Masanja]

Supposedly so (so says you) lakini nobody's buying into that kind of crappy excuse. What's more important for his professional and academic legacy: finishing the policies he had masterminded of fixing the US economy, or saving his tenureship at Harvard? Kumbe he's only good at talkin' the talk kama Obama: kashindwa kazi, maji aliona marefu sababu policies zake hazikuleta mafanikio aliyotarajia. Isitoshe, Wasomi wenzake waliobobea nao waliachia ngazi, na hata huyo replacement wake, Gene Spelling siyo Mchumi kitaaluma.

Mkuu lakini usisahau kwamba hawa hawa unaowakandya leo ndo wali-master-mind 'unprecented economic prsperity' ya kipindi cha Clinton. From my perspective US has been spending limitlessly in the name of terror. Hivi unafikiri vita kule Iraq/Afghanistan nk hela zinatoka wapi? Hata ungeleta mchumi kutoka Mars....US must revist its way of spending and this culture of entitlements! Huwezi kuwa unakopa tuu bila kurudisha ukategemea kwamba uchumi utakua. And ofcourse the world has changed! There are new kids on the block!

 

[Mdondoaji]

Supposedly so (so says you) lakini nobody's buying into that kind of crappy excuse. What's more important for his professional and academic legacy: finishing the policies he had masterminded of fixing the US economy, or saving his tenureship at Harvard? Kumbe he's only good at talkin' the talk kama Obama: kashindwa kazi, maji aliona marefu sababu policies zake hazikuleta mafanikio aliyotarajia. Isitoshe, Wasomi wenzake waliobobea nao waliachia ngazi, na hata huyo replacement wake, Gene Spelling siyo Mchumi kitaaluma.

Mkuu naona unachanganya na kujichanganya mwenyewe kwanza tofautisha baina ya National Economic Council na Council of Economic Advisors. National Economic Council ni forum ya washauri tu na mainly wanadeal na Domestic policies of the country. Council of Economic Advisors wanadeal na advisory to the president in regards to economic policy.

Zaidi soma hapo chini:-

The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) is a group of three economists who advise the President of the United States on economic policy.[1] It is a part of the Executive Office of the President of the United States, and provides much of the economic policy of the White House. The council prepares the annual Economic Report of the President.


The National Economic Council (NEC) of the United States is the principal forum used by the President of the United States for considering economic policy matters, separate from matters relating to domestic policy, which are the domain of the Domestic Policy Council. The council forms part of the Office of White House Policy which contains the DPC, the National Economic Council and various subordinate offices, such as the Office of National AIDS Policy. The Director of the NEC is titled the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council.


Sasa kundi moja ni advisory (Council of Economic Advisor) wengine wanafacilitate na coordination (NEC) tofautisha hivyo vitu viwili kwanza.

Pia katika hiyo council huwezi kuingia kuwa advisor kuwa economist mkuu soma walioshika nafasi za advisory hapa chini ni hawa:-
1. Austan Dean Goolsbee - BA Economics, MA economics , PhD Economics huyu ndio current chairman of the council.
2. Cecilia Elena Rouse - BA Economics, PhD Economics.
3. Christina Romer- BA Economics, PhD Economics.

Chairman waliopita:-
1. Edward Paul "Ed" Lazear - BA Economics, MA Economics na PhD Economics
2. Ben Shalom Bernanke- BA Economics, PhD Economics
3. Harvey S. Rosen - BA Economics, Masters in Economics and PhD Economics

etc....

Wenzetu mkuu kila mtu na fani yake hawekwi mtu kama hajasomea fani husika hasa ya advisory. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Bernanke#cite_note-0

 

[Mdondoaji]

Supposedly so (so says you) lakini nobody's buying into that kind of crappy excuse. What's more important for his professional and academic legacy: finishing the policies he had masterminded of fixing the US economy, or saving his tenureship at Harvard? Kumbe he's only good at talkin' the talk kama Obama: kashindwa kazi, maji aliona marefu sababu policies zake hazikuleta mafanikio aliyotarajia. Isitoshe, Wasomi wenzake waliobobea nao waliachia ngazi, na hata huyo replacement wake, Gene Spelling siyo Mchumi kitaaluma.

Nani amekwambia hawa jamaa wameshindwa kazi ? Let me provide you with some statistics ujue wenzetu hawapigi siasa bali wanafanya kazi:-
a. Unemployment rate has fallen by 8.9% signs kuwa uchumi unakuwa, kazi zinapatikana na kuna uzalishaji.
b. GDP growth rate is 2.8% after the revisions.
c. Consumer spending is slowly growing by 0.2% this is partly after taking into accounting soaring food prices, oil prices etc.
d. Market capitalization (trading in the capital market) is growing showing a confidence in investors in US manufacturing industry.

Sasa kwa taarifa hizi kidogo hebu niambie wapi wamefeli. Ukiwalinganisha US na nchi kama Greece, Ireland, UK , France na Spain they are a doing a damn good job tuache siasa.

Tanzania aibu siasa nyingi hakuna output!!!!

 

[Prof Griff]

Mkuu naona unachanganya na kujichanganya mwenyewe kwanza tofautisha baina ya National Economic Council na Council of Economic Advisors. National Economic Council ni forum ya washauri tu na mainly wanadeal na Domestic policies of the country. Council of Economic Advisors wanadeal na advisory to the president in regards to economic policy.

Zaidi soma hapo chini:-

The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) is a group of three economists who advise the President of the United States on economic policy.[1] It is a part of the Executive Office of the President of the United States, and provides much of the economic policy of the White House. The council prepares the annual Economic Report of the President.


The National Economic Council (NEC) of the United States is the principal forum used by the President of the United States for considering economic policy matters, separate from matters relating to domestic policy, which are the domain of the Domestic Policy Council. The council forms part of the Office of White House Policy which contains the DPC, the National Economic Council and various subordinate offices, such as the Office of National AIDS Policy. The Director of the NEC is titled the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council.


Sasa kundi moja ni advisory (Council of Economic Advisor) wengine wanafacilitate na coordination (NEC) tofautisha hivyo vitu viwili kwanza.

Pia katika hiyo council huwezi kuingia kuwa advisor kuwa economist mkuu soma walioshika nafasi za advisory hapa chini ni hawa:-
1. Austan Dean Goolsbee - BA Economics, MA economics , PhD Economics huyu ndio current chairman of the council.
2. Cecilia Elena Rouse - BA Economics, PhD Economics.
3. Christina Romer- BA Economics, PhD Economics.

Chairman waliopita:-
1. Edward Paul "Ed" Lazear - BA Economics, MA Economics na PhD Economics
2. Ben Shalom Bernanke- BA Economics, PhD Economics
3. Harvey S. Rosen - BA Economics, Masters in Economics and PhD Economics

etc....

Wenzetu mkuu kila mtu na fani yake hawekwi mtu kama hajasomea fani husika hasa ya advisory.

Mimi nazungumzia NEC, hiyo confusion naona ipo akilini mwako tu ndugu ili na wewe uonyeshe unajua kitu, siyo? Nipe orodha waliojiuluzu kwenye NEC tokea Obama aingie madarkani, halafu niambie huyo aliyechukua nafasi ya Larry Summers kama ni Mchumi by training.

 

[Mdondoaji]

Anza wewe. Tutafutie degree ya Economics ya Kikwete kutoka UDSM tuchambue knowledge yake ya "Quadrative Equation Pro-Analysis", Micro-megaeconomics", "Macro-metaeconomics", "Megalomaniacnomics" na upupu mwingine.

Mkuu anzisha thread ya elimu ya JK tutajadili humu sikupi nafasi ya kuharibu mjadala wetu na advisor wako wa uchumi. Hata hivyo bado msimamo wako ule ule uliosema mwanzo kuwa mshauri si mtendaji?

 

[Mdondoaji]

Mimi nazungumzia NEC, hiyo confusion naona ipo akilini mwako tu ndugu ili na wewe uonyeshe unajua kitu, siyo? Nipe orodha waliojiuluzu kwenye NEC tokea Obama aingie madarkani, halafu niambie huyo aliyechukua nafasi ya Larry Summers kama ni Mchumi by training.

Sasa kwa taarifa tu NEC sio advisors wa rais soma vizuri utafahamu washauri wa rais katika masuala ya uchumi ni kina nani??? Vile vile imekuwaje unaniambia mie najifanya kujua kila kitu au nimekosea kukupa angalizo? Kwa taarifa zaidi soma hapo chini:-

The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) is a group of three economists who advise the President of the United States on economic policy.[1] It is a part of the Executive Office of the President of the United States, and provides much of the economic policy of the White House. The council prepares the annual Economic Report of the President.

Source: Wikipedia.

 

[Masanja]

Mkuu anzisha thread ya elimu ya JK tutajadili humu sikupi nafasi ya kuharibu mjadala wetu na advisor wako wa uchumi. Hata hivyo bado msimamo wako ule ule uliosema mwanzo kuwa mshauri si mtendaji?

Asante mkubwa nimekusoma.. maelezo na ufafanuzi wako vinajitosheleza! Kudos kiongozi!

 

[epigenetics]

Kati ya washauri wa raisi waliobobea wa uchumi ni marehemu Justinian Rweyemamu.

Justinian Rweyemamu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Alikuwa mzuri kiasi kwamba hadi hapo mbeleni alipotofautiana na Nyerere kuhusu policy za uchumi, alijiuzuru na kuendelea na profession yake ya uchumi kwengine.

Kuna haja ya Tanzania kuwa na timu ya washauri wa uchumi walio full-time ikulu, who are non-partisan. Kwani sioni umuhimu wa kuwa na payroll kwa ajili ya wakurugenzi, katibu wakuu wa mikoa / wilaya.