The Convergence of the Narcotics Underworld and Extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Its Global Proliferation Chapter Seven

[Abdull Kazi]

Chapter Seven

Afghanistan’s Collapse and the Future of Counternarcotics​

By the autumn of 2021, the Taliban took complete control of Afghanistan as the government of Ashraf Ghani collapsed. This unfortunate series of events began with the signing of the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan on February 29, 2020. In this agreement, the Trump administration agreed to pull all US troops out of Afghanistan by May 2021 if the Taliban agreed to a ceasefire with the Afghan government and to stop international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda from plotting attacks on the West from within the country.

The US began steadily lowering their troop presence after signing the peace agreement. Surprisingly, the foreign policies of the Trump and Biden administrations aligned on this matter. President Biden announced on April 14, 2021 the intent to pull all US forces out of Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, opting for a delayed exit, citing security concerns.

This timeline was later updated to August 31, 2021, with the caveat of maintaining a contingent of about 1,000 troops to secure the US Embassy and Kabul International Airport. The US continued their troop withdrawal through the summer of 2021, vacating Bagram Airfield, the largest US-operated airfield in the country, in the dark of night on July 2, 2021.

By this point, the Taliban had gained control of a third of the country’s districts, including Badakhshan province. By early August, they controlled over half of the country, with 114 more districts in dispute. On August 15, the Taliban took control of Kabul and occupied the Presidential Palace after President Ghani fled the country, signalling their victory over the Ghani government and their complete authority over the country.

This will no doubt lead to drastic changes in the security situation in Afghanistan and subsequently narcotics trafficking in the country. It seems clear that there were security vulnerabilities in the withdrawal that were overlooked. One significant vulnerability is the Taliban’s access to the US military’s biometrics database.

The Taliban is actively seeking out individuals in the country they believe to be a threat to their power, including those who have worked with the US or NATO forces in any capacity. Taliban leadership claimed they were trying to restore stability, and weren’t going to be seeking retribution against their perceived enemies.

Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson who was central to the peace talks in Doha, stated, “Nobody is going to harm you, nobody is going to knock on your doors.” It appears that many Taliban militants did not receive this memo, with multiple reports of Taliban operatives raiding homes in search of individuals they deemed threats, which included activists and journalists.

According to a UN investigation, the Taliban are searching for anyone who worked with US and NATO forces, and are threatening to harm or kill family members if they are not found.

The biometrics devices are called Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE). Developed by US defence contractor L-1 Identity Solutions, HIIDE is a durable portable scanner that collects iris, fingerprint, and facial recognition biometric data.823 These devices were not only used to identify terrorists, but also civilians who worked at US embassies, consulates, or other diplomatic posts.

The Defense Department stated their goal was to collect biometrics on 80% of 815 Dion Nissenbaum and Ehsanullah Amiri, “U.S., Taliban Sign Deal Meant to End America’s Longest War,” The Intercept, Aug. 17, 2021, https:// 152 the Afghan population, or 25 million people. It has been reported that the Pentagon’s Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) has collected data on at least one million individuals through HIIDE and other data collection devices, although the real number could be much higher.

The concern now is that the Taliban have access to all of this biometric data and could potentially identify civilians who worked with US or NATO and retaliate against them. While there is doubt that the Taliban have the technological capabilities to utilise this technology, the Pakistani ISI, their long-time ally, could access the data for them.

Welton Chang, chief technology officer for Human Rights First and former US Army intelligence officer remarked, “I don’t think anyone ever thought about data privacy or what to do in the event the [HIIDE] system fell into the wrong hands.”

Therefore, failsafe mechanisms were not implemented in the systems to safeguard against intelligence getting compromised. Much of the problem between the 18 months from Trump signing the Doha agreement to his successor Biden deciding to move ahead with the withdrawal stems from whether the Taliban would fulfil the conditions they committed to as laid out in the Doha agreement.

Therefore, creating contingency plans in case of a potential Taliban takeover was not considered nor thought likely with the speed of the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government along with the Taliban reneging on all their promises. As a consequence, the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) were not able to take over the defence of the country independent of Western support.

The military and diplomatic strategy for Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this book, however it is important to reflect on the overall approach to the war in Afghanistan and the way it ended, given its major impact on the international narcotics industry.

There will be many post mortems on this war to come, and these reflections come at a time when the situation on the ground is changing from day to day. This is in no way an exhaustive analysis, but an attempt to shine a light on some strategic weaknesses that may have led to the rapid collapse of the ANDSF and the Taliban’s return to power.

One of the issues with the handover of control to the ANDSF is they had insufficient capacity to secure the country on their own. First, there were drastically less troops in the ANDSF than what was officially reported. Afghan commanders reportedly had been inflating the size of their army for years to get more funding from the US.

The ANDSF had officially 352,000 soldiers and police officers as of 2019, but they were only able to provide evidence of 254,000 troops. They also failed to report the total number of ANDSF troops who died in combat.

This lack of clarity in troop numbers made it difficult to strategize how to secure posts effectively, since the number of available troops was largely unknown.826 Given the insufficient size of the ANDSF and mishandling of resources, many troops were deployed for months without pay.

This coupled with the territorial gains by the Taliban over several months led to a fall in morale and high attrition rate, growing as much as 5,000 troops a month in the final months before their defeat, while only gaining 300- 500 to counteract the drop.827 The ANDSF had nowhere near the capacity necessary to protect the country from the Taliban.

This capacity issue was present since the beginning of the US engagement in Afghanistan. According to several interviews with US and NATO officials, they believe there was not enough effort to recruit and train a sizable Afghan army in the early days of the conflict, when the Taliban had largely fled to Pakistan and were too disorganised and small to pose a major threat to Afghanistan. decision to limit resources to train enough Afghan forces came from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who wanted to cap the amount of Afghan soldiers and police at 50,000, significantly below the 130,000 to 200,000 amount that the Afghan government said they required to secure the country.

Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, who served as the White House’s ‘Afghan war czar’ during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, reported, “If we started with [building the ANDSF] in 2002-2006 when the Taliban was weak and disorganised, things may have been different.”

Lute argued that because the United States shifted its focus to the conflict in Iraq, it did not put enough attention and resources towards building up Afghan forces in the early years of the conflict when the Taliban were weak enough to gain the upper hand.829 By the time the Taliban had a resurgence around 2007, Western forces tried to build up the army too quickly, and were unable to sufficiently train enough troops to effectively secure the country.

Another issue was the unclear overall strategy of what was needed to have the Afghan forces take control of the country especially without the air support that they had always relied on to fight the Taliban. The Afghan forces were trained to coordinate their operations with US special reconnaissance units, helicopters and airstrikes. They lost their superiority to the Taliban when the air support ended.

The ANDSF were unable to rely on their training and without a defensive plan. In SIGAR’s “Lessons Learned” interview with Nicholas Burns, who served as ambassador to NATO under George W. Bush, he accurately predicted the downfall of Afghanistan: “I think our correct working assumption about Afghanistan… in those years [2003-2007], was that they cannot do this on their own.

They cannot survive without us, and… if we decided that we were going to end the mission… we would risk the return of the Taliban.” Ambassador Burns went on to lament that despite this assumption of a doomed Afghanistan if they were to pull out, the US mission did not adjust their overall strategy to enable a transition to an independent Afghan national force.

The general strategic approach was mostly reactive and with short term goals in mind.833 Without a clear plan of how to effectively transition to a situation where the ANDSF could independently secure the country, the Afghanistan campaign had been heading down this tragic path for some time. This sad ending to the war in Afghanistan presents an opportunity for NATO members to reflect on the current paradigms that exist in theatres of operation.

An overarching focus on short term victories and reactive operations leave little room for creating a self-sufficient native force. If the goal is to create a country that can govern itself, this must be central to the strategy of all operations. While the Taliban now have full control over Afghanistan, the instability that may come in the months and years ahead could threaten their hold over the country.

With a population hiding in fear and women banned from working, there is a shortage of essential workers to maintain public utilities.

This could exacerbate the tensions already permeating through the country. The question then is if the Taliban’s hegemony could be challenged. We may see the rise of anti-Taliban militias to contest the Taliban’s control. A number of anti-Taliban 828 SIGAR (Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), “Senior U.S. Official, Lessons Learned interview, 5/5/2016,” published by The Washington Post, May 5, 2016,

Santora and Blue, “Protests Spread to Kabul.” 154 militias formed in the months leading up to the Taliban takeover, composed of veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War who opposed the Soviet invasion but also stood against the sectarianism or fundamentalism of the Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani and other government officials welcomed their emergence, and called for a united resistance against the Taliban.

However, the most prominent of these groups were quickly disposed of by Taliban forces. One of those was led by Mohammed Ismail Khan. Khan has a colourful background to say the least: he’s an ethnic Tajik who fought with the mujahidin in the initial revolt against the Soviets, and rose to prominence as a warlord of Herat in the 1980s and 1990s.

He was eventually booted from the city when the Taliban took over in the late 1990s. He then joined the Northern Alliance and helped take back Herat from the Taliban in 2001 with US forces, regaining his position as governor of Herat.

He was made the Minister of Energy and Water under the Karzai administration in 2004, and held that position until 2013 after he called on his followers to take up arms against the Taliban, announcing the Karzai government would not protect them.

In July, Khan made similar appeals to his followers to organise a militia under his leadership to fend off a Taliban incursion. He fended off the Taliban from taking over Herat for two weeks before eventually surrendering August 12, 2021.837 This started a domino effect of other prominent militias falling to Taliban forces.

As the ANDSF was on its last legs, the Ghani government sought to strengthen their numbers by deploying the militia groups together in a new coalition.

These militias consisted of Jamiat-e-Islami, led by a former warlord of Balkh province, Atta Muhammad Noor, Hezb-e-Junbish, led by warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum and Hezbe-e Wahdat Islami Mardom-e Afghanistan, led by Haji Muhammad Muhaqiq.

This alliance was short-lived, and when their forces lost to the Taliban in Mazar-i-Sharif, the surviving militia members fled the country.838 It is possible, however, that they could regroup to challenge the Taliban another day. A Taliban-controlled Afghanistan may spur a resistance movement from Hazara militias. Multiple have already formed in recent years as the Taliban threat loomed.

The Hazara have long feared a Taliban resurgence, having been targeted by them during their rule in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It appears their fears were warranted, and the Taliban have already begun to target Hazaras in recent attacks. On July 3, 2021, Hazara residents of Mundarakt, Ghazni province fled their homes as the Taliban advanced on the ANDSF towards their village.

They escaped to their summer grazing land and stayed in basic shelters they had set up. However, with little food to feed the entire village, some residents made the harrowing journey back to their village to gather supplies. Upon their return, they found the Taliban had taken over their village, and they soon captured the returning residents.

Three of these residents were shot, and three more tortured to death. Another three that escaped to the grazing land tried to find refuge in a neighbouring village, but were caught and executed as well. From July 4-6, nine Hazara men were murdered.840 These atrocities could motivate Hazara militias to band together against the Taliban.

One militia that has risen to prominence recently is called the Resistance for Justice Movement, a Hazara militia that has mobilised to protect Hazara regions around west Kabul and Hazarajat from incursions by the Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP).

Another Hazara militia led by Abdul Ghani Alipur and based in Wardak Province was engaged in combat against both the Taliban and the Ghani govern Dan De Luce, Mushtaq Yusufzai, and Saphora Smith, “Even the Taliban Are Surprised at How Fast They’re Advancing in Afghanistan

Afghanistan-taliban-responsible-for-brutal-massacre-ofhazara-men-new-investigation/. ment over the summer of 2021. Another emerging militia group that may challenge the Taliban’s rule is called the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (formerly the Second Resistance).

They are led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of former anti-Soviet militia leader and Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. Massoud is attempting to make the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan a revival of the Northern Alliance, forming a coalition of armed groups throughout the north of Afghanistan to fend off a Taliban incursion.

Massoud has used old symbols of Northern Alliance to play up the fond sentiments that many in the north still carry for the group, flying their flags and playing their national anthem at rallies. The National Resistance was bolstered by the addition of former Vice President and self-proclaimed acting president Amrullah Saleh, who has called on Afghans to join their resistance in the Panjshir Valley and mount an offensive against the Taliban.

Saleh stayed behind to resist the Taliban when former President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, gaining him respect and admiration from many Afghans who are against the Taliban’s rule. 843 When asked why he decided to stay after the Taliban took over, Saleh said, “I am a soldier of Ahmad Shah Massoud and, in his dictionary, there was no such thing as fleeing, exile and leaving the nation in bad moments.

If I had escaped, I might have been physically alive, but as soon as I reached any corner of the globe, I would have died instantly. Saleh was a former member of the Northern Alliance and served under Massoud’s father. With the addition of Saleh to the resistance force in Panjshir Valley, it brings more legitimacy to their movement. This could potentially rally more groups to join them and mount a united opposition.

While Massoud said the group would be ready to fight the Taliban, he stated he is hoping for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban to establish a government with representation from the various ethnic groups in the country. On August 18, 2021, three days after the Taliban conquered Kabul, Massoud released an op-ed in the Washington Post declaring the formation of his resistance force against the Taliban in the Panjshir Valley.

According to Massoud, his forces now comprise soldiers from the ANDSF, former members of Afghan Special Forces, and members of what he calls the “mujahideen.” The point of this article was clearly to make an appeal to Western governments for support.

He wrote, “If Taliban warlords launch an assault, they will of course face staunch resistance from us… Yet we know that our military forces and logistics will not be sufficient.

They will be rapidly depleted unless our friends in the West can find a way to supply us without delay.” It appears Massoud is seeking a similar arrangement from the West that the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia had with the original incarnation of the mujahidin. It is uncertain if Western governments have an appetite for supporting militias in Afghanistan.

This will unlikely happen without the backing of the United States. US intelligence agencies met with Massoud prior to the Taliban takeover to gather intelligence in the region, but they did not establish a formal cooperation agreement between them.

It should however be noted that while they only engaged with the National Resistance Front for intelligence purposes, there was likely an underlying assumption of mutual benefit, or else the group would have little incentive to share intelligence.

With the US completing their withdrawal from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021, this arrangement may have changed. President Biden has made several statements doubling down on his commitment to cease all involvement in Afghanistan beyond remote CT operations and hu Zucchino and Faizi, “Attacked and Vulnerable.”

Ahmad Massoud, “The Mujahideen Resistance to the Taliban Begins Now. But We Need Help,” The Washington Post, Aug. 18, 2021, mujahideen-resistance-taliban-ahmad-massoud/. Gibbons-Neff and Barnes. “New Afghan Allies.” 156 manitarian aid.

White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan in the Biden administration said the government was open to potentially sending economic and developmental assistance to Afghanistan depending on the Taliban’s actions.

He said, “We do believe that there is an important dimension of humanitarian assistance that should go directly to the people of Afghanistan.” It is uncertain what they will consider “direct aid to the people of Afghanistan,” and if financial assistance to this resistance force would qualify. Some members of Congress are already actively pushing to back this resistance force.

Beyond the United States, the National Resistance Front has formed relationships with France, India, Iran, the UK, and Russia.

Russia was particularly open to aiding the group, selling weapons to the group through a third party. However, with the Taliban now in charge, Russia has pulled a 180 and has made clear they have no intentions of challenging the Taliban’s authority.

Russia’s ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov spoke on August 20, 2021, stating, “We can’t wave reality aside. They [the Taliban] are the de facto authorities. There is no alternative to the Taliban in Afghanistan.” Zhirnov even directly addressed Amrullah Saleh’s declaration of being the caretaker president of Afghanistan, saying he violated the constitution and the National Resistance Front’s opposition had no chance of victory.

He went on to say, “They have no military prospects. There are not many people there. As far as we know they have 7,000 armed people. And they already have problems with fuel. They tried to fly a helicopter but they have no petrol and no supplies.” Russia seems to be weighing the probability of the Taliban staying in power and believing it is in their best interest to stay on their good side.

With their strong ties to Central Asia, and a large Central Asian diaspora living in the country, Russia is likely fearful of extremism from Afghanistan pouring into the rest of Central Asia and eventually Russia. This creates a strong incentive to not make themselves an enemy of the Taliban. Their aid to the National Resistance Front occurred while the future of Afghanistan was unclear and there was a possibility of a contested rule.

They were clearly hedging their bets on potential victors, and they’ve now decided the Taliban are the best bet. A potential cause for civil conflict across the country would be a schism within the Taliban. Despite their display of a united organisation, the Taliban has been undergoing an internal struggle for power for years between multiple leaders and factions within the organisation. With their rise to power, this struggle may come to a head as they are expected to name their new cabinet ministers.

While the Taliban is officially under the leadership of Hibatullah Akhundzada, management of Taliban operations are currently split between three deputies: Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani network, Mohammad Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, and Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the founding members of the Taliban who heads up their Doha political office.

Akhundzada delegated the organisation’s operations in order to prevent any from gaining outsized power and forming a powerful faction. Haqqani and Yaqoob have drastically different visions for the organisation, which are starting to come into conflict with each other. As was covered earlier in this book, Haqqani is closely tied with the Pakistani ISI and JeM, with the Kashmir conflict high on their radar. In May 2020, a Taliban spokesman operating under Yaqoob made the surprising statement regarding their position on In847 Alex Woodward,dia’s revocation of Kashmir’s special status autonomy, stating that the Taliban “does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

” This is wildly out of step with the Haqqani network’s position, which hosted anti-Indian militants in a Taliban training camp a month prior, while sending several Haqqani network operatives to train under JeM leadership in Pakistan.

There are also signs of Yaqoob and Baradar butting heads over the cabinet membership, with Yaqoob vying for military commanders to join the cabinet while Baradar was pushing for political leaders who were active in the Doha peace negotiations. Yaqoob has made public statements chiding Baradar for trying to dictate terms for the Taliban while enjoying the luxuries of Doha living safely away from conflict.

This conflict may come to a head soon with a light shining on the uncertain leadership of the group. The pandemic may have already claimed Akhundzada, who was confirmed to have contracted the virus and was in critical condition as of the summer of 2020, with some reports that he has already died.

The Taliban have held that he is living in Kandahar and will make a public appearance soon, but as of this writing he has yet to be seen by the public, outside of one photo released by the Taliban from an unknown date. The Taliban may be delaying the revelation of his death/sickness until they have determined his successor and solidified the cabinet ministers.

Taliban spokesman Waheedullah Hashimi may have given up the game in an interview just days after the Taliban takeover. He said that Akhundzada would rule above the head of the council, but would not be a member of the council. He said, “Maybe [Akhundzada’s] deputy will play the role of ‘president’.”

He is implying that someone besides Akhundzada would lead the council, with Akhundzada supposedly running things from the shadows. This would allow them to claim he is still alive and running the show without ever having to show him in public. This is not without precedent – the Taliban hid the death of Mullah Omar for two years.

So the question then becomes – who is this deputy who will really run the show? The man who was now expected to be the de facto leader of the Taliban is Abdul Ghani Baradar.

While Yaqoob had been floated as the likely successor for the past few years given his taking over all ground operations in Afghanistan, Baradar’s public role in signing the peace deal with the United States brought his name to prominence among world leaders and gave him more international legitimacy than Yaqoob.

While Baradar’s role in the organisation has been quiet in recent years and he had not stepped foot in the country in a decade, he was one of the founding members of the organisation. He had been an active member of the original mujahidin fighting the Soviets while serving under Mullah Omar, the future Taliban’s original leader. He helped found the Taliban with Omar and was part of the original group that conquered Afghanistan in 1996.

Baradar was soon promoted to deputy defence minister under Omar. When the Taliban fled to Pakistan after the USled coalition had begun their military operation in Afghanistan in 2001, Baradar gained a reputation as a strong leader in the organisation. Baradar’s exit from leadership was not by choice. Pakistan’s ISI arrested him in Karachi in 2010.

Eight years later, the US made the call for Pakistan to release him from prison to take part in the peace talks in Doha. Perhaps this was because Baradar had tried to broker a peace agreement with President Karzai back in 2010 before he was arrested. The West likely saw him as the best chance of achieving a political settlement now that it was in the interest of the Afghan government.

In the 2018-2020 negotiations, He took on the role of lead negotiator and was the one to sign the official peace deal that eventually led to the Taliban’s takeover. Once this Shishir Gupta, “Kashmir Is India’s Internal Matter, Says Taliban; Denies Plan to Target Delhi,” Hindustani Times, May 19, 2020,

This further cemented him as the de facto leader of the organisation.858 Since the Taliban’s takeover of the country, the Haqqani network’s role in the organisation has grown in prominence and visibility. No longer the hidden arm of the Taliban, Sirajuddin has been named the military chief of the Taliban and the network has been placed in charge of security in Kabul.

According to US and former Afghan officials, an elite militant unit operating under the Haqqani network, the Badri Army, has been charged with securing the Kabul airport.

Despite his now prominent public position in the Taliban, Sirajuddin has not been seen in public for months. On May 29, 2021, it was reported that Sirajuddin Haqqani also came down with the virus and was last known to have been taken to a military hospital in Pakistan.860 He has not been heard from since, as of this writing.

Haqqani’s and Akhundaza’s departure from operational power enabled Yaqoob to take control of the Taliban entirely, both financially and militarily.Yaqoob was in charge of the Taliban militia when they took over the country, which may give him a strong claim to leadership. Meanwhile, Baradar has been seen as the de facto political leader given his role in the peace deal and subsequent diplomatic engagement with world powers.

However, with the gains the Haqqani network has made in Kabul, they too may push for leadership. Although Sirajuddin Haqqani may no longer be able to claim power, someone else in that camp may already be positioning themselves to take over. The Haqqani network is a very nepotistic and hierarchical organisation.

They have always been run by a patriarch, so it is difficult to imagine someone leading the organisation outside of the family. If Sirajuddin Haqqani is dead/incapacitated from COVID-19, there are a few people who would presumably take over. Anas Haqqani is Sirajuddin’s younger brother and, according to former Afghan officials, is a high-ranking leader in the organisation who has managed important strategic operations as deputy to his brother. According to Afghan intelligence, Anas has been producing online propaganda for the organisation and has also overseen fundraising for militant operations.

The Haqqani network denies his involvement in the organisation, claiming he is simply a student. Then there is Hafiz Rashid, who was the Haqqani network’s military commander for southeastern Afghanistan. He has a longtime connection to the network, given his brother was deputy to network founder Jalaluddin during the 1990s. He reportedly coordinated multiple suicide bombing attacks. Both Anas and Rashid were captured by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) in October 2014.

It appears that Anas is more important to the network than they claimed; they released two high-value captive professors from the American University of Afghanistan in exchange for Anas and Hafiz on November 12, 2019. Anas was officially named to be on the Taliban’s negotiating team in Doha beginning in February 2019, while he was still in prison.

After his release, he was present at the signing ceremony of the peace deal, indicating his clear prominence in the Taliban.865 Khalil Ahmed Haqqani is the brother of network founder Jalaluddin and uncle of current leader 858 NPR (National Public Radio), “What We Know About Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, New Taliban Leader,

Haqqani Leader Says ‘We Are the Taliban,’ Contrary to State Department Claims,” Washington Examiner.

He is a senior member of the network and has overseen significant fundraising activities for the organisation. He has also overseen militant operations, having deployed militants to operations in Paktia Province in 2002. He has strong ties to the Gulf, having made several trips to court Taliban benefactors in the region.866 Just days after the Taliban took power, Khalil made a rare public appearance celebrating their victory and extolling the peace that would come of this.

Both he and Anas met with former President Hamid Karzai a week after the Taliban took power to discuss a potential power-sharing agreement in a transitional government. While it is uncertain how likely this power-sharing arrangement is to succeed, it speaks volumes that both Haqqani men were present to represent the Taliban in the talks.867 Then there is Yahya Haqqani, brother-in-law to Sirajuddin. He has acted as head of the organisation when Sirajuddin and Khalil have been unavailable.

He oversees logistics operations and handles the funding of many Haqqani commanders. Yahya has been a key figure in orchestrating attacks, having coordinated the distribution of IEDs, communication equipment, and funds for several operations. As a fluent Arabic speaker, he has been invaluable as a translator for Sirajuddin with Arabic-speaking allies and militants.

He has also handled media and propaganda for the organisation.868 Another high-ranking network member who may rise to prominence is Abdul Aziz Ahbasin, who reports directly to Sirajuddin.

He is the Taliban shadow governor of Paktika Province, Afghanistan. He oversees a foreign fighter training camp in the province and has command over several militant cells. 869 All of these potential successors and leaders may be a moot consideration if Sirajuddin recovers from COVID-19.

However, given the level to which the Taliban has tried to conceal his hospitalisation, it appears they have reason to be worried of the public finding out Sirajuddin’s condition. Tension between Khalil Ahmed Haqqani and Abdul Ghani Baradar has already manifested itself in a physical manner.

On the evening of September 3, 2021, a violent altercation broke out in Kabul’s presidential palace between the two figures, in which Haqqani reportedly punched Baradar. A shootout then ensued between the men and their respective security details.

The fight was allegedly about concerns regarding the Panjshir Valley in the northeast of Afghanistan, which was considered a stronghold of the National Resistance Front at the time.

Baradar wanted to cease combat and call Taliban soldiers back, while the Haqqanis preferred to continue battling against the resistance forces. Baradar later made an appearance publicly to deny the existence of any “internal disputes” within the Taliban leadership. A complete split between the Haqqani and Baradar factions of the Taliban would spell more trouble for the international community, with the Haqqani network likely to further consolidate its power over both the group and the country itself.

With the Haqqani network’s infamous links to the narcotics trade already established, one can only predict that the drug economy of Afghanistan will continue to consume the nation if the Haqqanis eclipse Baradar’s influence.

If more battle lines were drawn between Yaqoob, Sirajuddin Haqqani (or a Haqqani successor) and Baradar, it would throw the country into a chaotic situation. In general terms, Yaqoob would find support in the south around Kandahar while the Haqqani network and Baradar would find support in the northeast, given their Pashtun nationalities.

However, Yaqoob has been building 866 United Kingdom, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/404, Division (43), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/404 of 7 March 2017 implementing Article 11(4), UK Statute Law Database, The National Archives, March 7, 2017, David Loyn, “Punch-up at the palace:

why the Taliban is tearing itself apart,” The Spectator, Sep 20, 2021relationships with commanders in the north since taking over from Haqqani, so that region may be in play.

Yaqoob is quite popular in the southern regions of Afghanistan due to being the son of Mullah Omar. However, Baradar holds a lot of respect as well given his history as a founding member of the Taliban.873 Sirajuddin, like the rest of the Haqqanis, faces mistrust from Kandahari Taliban members.

This is mostly because of the family’s association with the Pakistani military.874 The Haqqani network would find support in North Waziristan as well as over the Pakistani border in Loya Paktia, which has long been in their sphere of influence. The network could also presumably rely on the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, for support in an internal conflict.

While Yaqoob and Baradar have won the support of large swathes of the Taliban, the Haqqani network is a highly organised, well-funded organisation that would present a major challenge. There are more signs of cracks in the foundation of the Taliban besides the division between Haqqani, Yaqoob, and Baradar.

Gul Agha Ishakzai was Mullah Omar’s closest aid, and was placed in charge of the Taliban’s finances. Under his management, the Taliban’s annual income ballooned to reportedly USD $1.7 billion. He is well respected and very influential within the organisation. It is an open secret in the Taliban that a rivalry has been brewing between Yaqoob and Ishakzai.

While they may have had a warmer relationship when Yaqoob’s father was alive, there have been reports that Ishakzai has had reservations about Yaqoob’s ascent to leadership. Perhaps this was spurred by Yaqoob’s success in setting up a profitable financial commission through advancing on lucrative regions in the country, such as mining sites and narcotics hotspots.

However, with Ishaqzai getting named as the minister of finance in the new Taliban government, it may put his fears to rest.876 In addition to potential future rifts in the Taliban, small splinter groups have already formed that could grow into a threat to Taliban hegemony. A new group calling itself Hezb-e Walayat-e Islami is reported to have informally split from the Taliban following the US-Taliban peace agreement signed in February 2020.

This group of hardliners were against any kind of settlement with the Afghan government. They appear to be based in Iran and consist of Taliban veteran commanders in exile and militants from a number of Taliban offshoots. Some of these commanders are believed to be Mullah Zakir and Ibrahim Sadr, the former military commission chief of the Taliban.

Also among its ranks are members of the Feday-e Mahaz (Suicide Brigade), an established radical faction of the Taliban. Experts believe this group is led by Haji Najibullah, a disciple of Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by a US-led coalition in Helmand Province in 2007.877 Najibullah was named as intelligence chief in the new Taliban cabinet, perhaps as a way to bring this faction back into the fold.

Time will tell if this alliance will hold. Another result of the Taliban’s takeover is the resurgence of IS-KP (AKA ISIS-K). IS-KP has been on a decline in the past two years due to fighting the US, Afghan security forces, and the Taliban on different fronts. They had estimates of 2,000-4,000 members at their height, but appeared to have been nearly eradicated at the end of 2019 from confrontations with the US, Afghan security forces, and the Taliban.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2020” found that only 8% of all civilian 872 Lynne O’Donnell and Mirwais Khan, “Taliban Leadership in Disarray on Verge of Peace Talks,” Foreign Policy, May 29, 2020, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/29/taliban-leadership-disarray-coronavirus-covid-peace-talks/. 873 John Hudson, “CIA Director William Burns Held Secret Meeting in Kabul with Taliban Leader Abdul Ghani Baradar,” The Washington Post, Aug. 24, 2021,

Amalendu Misra, “Afghanistan: who’s who in the Taliban’s ‘inclusive’ new administration,” The Conversation, Aug. 17, 2021, https:// theconversation.com/afghanistan-whos-who-in-the-talibans-inclusive-new-administration-166767. Frud Bezhan, “Iranian Links: New Taliban Splinter Group Emerges That Opposes U.S. Peace Deal.” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (Prague, CZ), Jun. 9, 2020,

“Taliban’s administration.” casualties in 2020 were attributed to IS-KP attacks. The total number of civilian casualties from IS-KP dropped by 45% from 2019 to 2020. From 2019 to 2020, IS-KP lost the vast majority of the territory they controlled in eastern Afghanistan and were no longer able to take on the Taliban or Afghan security forces in conventional battle. They instead spent their efforts on high casualty suicide attacks and remote controlled IED attacks to maintain relevance and the appearance of strength.

In UNAMA’s report for the first quarter of 2021, there was a further reduction in the proportion of IS-KP casualties at only 5%.880 It seemed like IS-KP had become nearly eradicated in Afghanistan. This was until the suicide bombing attack outside Kabul airport on July 26, 2021 which killed 95 Afghans, 13 US service members, and injured well over 100 people.881 The terror group purposely chose this location and time to capitalise on the swarm of people trying to evacuate the country as the Taliban was taking over.

Just days before the strike, an IS-KP commander was interviewed by CNN and said they were waiting for an opportune moment to strike, which was soon to come. This commander claimed to have 600 men working under his command operating out of Kunar. 882 ISIS has historically thrived in unstable environments, as demonstrated in their founding in Syria and Iraq.

It is likely that IS-KP will continue to use the unrest in Afghanistan to launch more high-profile attacks and recruit more members. A perfect example is their October – November 2020 university attacks in Kabul, killing tens of civilians with suicide bombing, grenades, and gunfire. For a two-week period, the major institutions in Afghanistan were under assault, meant to terrorise the student population and leading to a massive evacuation of schools across the country.

These types of attacks can be easily implemented with limited resources and militants. With the unrest that Afghanistan will likely experience for the foreseeable future, IS-KP will likely continue to try to gain ground and become a formidable force.

It is unknown if their numbers are big enough to attempt to gain a territorial hold, or if they will stick with their current tactics, but regardless they will be a destabilising force in Afghanistan. Now that the Taliban have gained control over Kabul and become the de facto government of Afghanistan, one of two outcomes could occur: the Taliban government will continue to use narcotics trafficking as a primary source of financing, or they may move away from narcotics altogether.

It is possible that in order to normalise relations with other countries, the Taliban government would ban narcotics trade altogether. In their first press conference after taking power, Taliban assured the world that they would not engage in narcotics trafficking. On August 17, 2021, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said, “We are assuring our countrymen and women and the international community, we will not have any narcotics produced.

From now on, nobody’s going to get involved (in the heroin trade), nobody can be involved in drug smuggling.» The Taliban are clearly trying to show the world a presentable face for the organisation and hope to bring them international legitimacy. But could they actually follow through with a heroin ban? This is not without precedent. As was covered in this book, the Taliban banned opium production in 2000, which was the most successful ban of opium in Afghanistan to date.

Whether this move 879 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA). Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2020. Geneva, CH: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. February 2021. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/ default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf. 880 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA). Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict First Quarter Update: 1 January to 31 March 2021. Geneva, CH: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. April 2021. https://

unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_1st_quarter_2021_2_0.pdf. 881 Yuliya Talmazan, Mushtaq Yusufzai, Courtney Kube, and Andrea Mitchell, NBC News (New York, NY), Aug. 27, 2021, https://www. nbcnews.com/news/world/high-threat-terror-attack-disrupts-kabul-airport-evacuations-biden-deadline-n1277670. 882 Clarissa Ward, “Clarissa Ward’s Chilling Interview with ISIS-K leader,” CNN (Atlanta, GA), Aug. 28, 2021, Video News - CNN world/2021/08/28/isis-k-leader-intv-ward-afghanistan-kabul-attack-vpx.cnn. 883 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA), Afghanistan:

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 202, (Geneva, CH: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, February 2021), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/ default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf. 884 France 24, “Taliban vow to ban heroin, but can they survive without it?,” (Paris, FR), Aug. 19, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/livenew...to-ban-heroin-but-can-they-survive-without-it.

was made to improve international relations or to drive up the value of their existing supply of opium is in question, but it indicates their willingness to use opium bans to their advantage. Whether or not a Taliban government would stop engaging in narcotics trafficking depends on two main factors: whether they would make enough from other revenue sources to sustain the country, and whether they believe trafficking will impact their international standing enough to threaten their control of the country.

Given their current revenue of USD $1.6 billion a year, the Taliban have reached virtual financial independence. This is reportedly due to the strategic efforts of Mohammad Yaqoob to target profitable regions in the Taliban’s expansion efforts and maximise revenue streams. Under his financial commission plan, conceptualised in 2016, Yaqoob conquered areas rich in mineral resources, refined the Taliban’s taxation system to get higher returns, and developed high volume export markets for mined materials.

After conquering areas rich in valuable materials, like coal, salt, rubies, and emeralds, Yaqoob fostered relationships with wholesale buyers and exporters to purchase the mined resources. Due to Yaqoob’s focus on developing a mining enterprise, the Taliban’s grew their mining revenue from USD $35 million in 2016 to $464 in 2020, exceeding their narcotics revenue of $416 million, which is likely a first for the organisation.

At this rate of growth, mining alone could become a billion-dollar enterprise for the Taliban. The rest of their financial revenue for 2020 consisted of USD $240 million from foreign aid, $240 million from exports, $160 million from taxes, and $80 million from real estate.885 While their mineral wealth is significant, narcotics revenue is still central to financing the organisation. Even if it was possible for the Taliban to give up their narcotics revenue, they would be unlikely to want to rely more on their other major sources of revenue, like foreign aid.

The Taliban have long sought to become financially independent from foreign aid, which has made them subject to the interests of outside actors, like the Pakistani ISI, or donors from the Gulf. Now that foreign aid only makes up 15% of their total revenue, they likely have less concern for protecting those relationships, and more ability to operate independently.

This would be a strong indicator that they are unlikely to stop narcotics trafficking in the short term. If they were to stop trafficking, they would need to increase their reliance on foreign aid until they can gain enough funds from mining and real estate to make up the difference. While mining revenue has surpassed their narcotics revenue, they still make 26% of their revenue from drugs. This also does not consider the amount of tax revenue they make from poppy farmers, which is likely a high proportion of the USD $160 million.

As the Taliban struggles to secure their hold on the country, there is little doubt that they will rely on narcotics revenue to fund their operations. Even if there is relatively little conflict, the transition from opposition militia to governing political party will likely be turbulent to say the least. In the likely scenario of a financial crisis in the coming days, the Taliban will need to rapidly increase their cash flow, which narcotics trafficking is uniquely able to accomplish.

International sanctions on the Taliban may force them to rely further on narcotics trafficking. On August 18, 2021, the International Monetary Fund announced that they will block Afghanistan from receiving $460 million in COVID emergency reserves. This move by the IMF followed pressure from the Biden administration to block the country from receiving the funds that were already allocated to it along with other countries struggling from the pandemic.

The IMF says that they are not able to allocate funds to a government that is not recognised by some of their member states. Canada, the European Union, Russia, and the United States have not recognised the Taliban as the sovereign government of Afghanistan, which has stopped the IMF from releas885 Frud Bezhan, “Exclusive: Taliban’s Expanding ‘Financial Power’ Could Make It ‘Impervious’ To Pressure, Confidential Report Warns,” Radio Free Europe.

Radio Liberty (Prague, CZ), Sep. 16, 2020, Exclusive: Taliban's Expanding 'Financial Power' Could Make It 'Impervious' To Pressure, Confidential Report Warns. 163 ing the funds.886 The United States took things a step further and blocked their access to USD $9.4 billion in international reserves, which were owned by Afghanistan’s central bank, but were actually based in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.887 Because of this rapid shift in their access to finances and the internal turmoil the country is experiencing, Afghanistan is already experiencing a massive economic downturn in an already struggling economy.

The afghani currency is priced at record lows and they are undergoing rapid inflation, rocketing up the price of basic food essentials like eggs and flour.888 On top of all of this, the country is experiencing some of the worst effects of climate change in the world, with some areas of Afghanistan warming twice as fast as the global average.

This has led to the second drought in three years.889 As with the last drought, this one will likely push farmers who can’t rely on licit crops to turn to drought-resistant opium. If the relief funds were not blocked, they could have gone towards subsidising farmers’ crops to protect them against the drought. While several governments seem to be using a form of economic sanctions as leverage over the Taliban, it may backfire. If Afghanistan is cut off from foreign aid and their reserves, it will only further ensure their reliance on narcotics trafficking.

This will in turn benefit extremist groups, both in Afghanistan and beyond. Perhaps a better approach would be to earmark funds towards licit sectors in the economy, like subsidising licit farming. This will reduce the likelihood of farmers turning towards poppy farming and reduce the Taliban’s share of opium profits, both from taxing crops and their own trafficking.

Another result of being cut off from funds is Afghanistan may not have sufficient hard currency to circulate. In the past, the Taliban would use opium poppies to barter for goods in rural areas, so we may see a return of this system at a much larger scale. It should be noted that even without the economic sanctions, the Afghanistan economy was already heavily reliant on opium. As demonstrated throughout this book, millions of farmers, labourers, smugglers, wholesalers, etc. are directly dependent on the cultivation, production, and distribution of opium for their livelihoods.

Beyond the direct beneficiaries are those who indirectly benefit from the opium industry – the local merchants whose products are purchased by poppy farmers, the hoteliers who host guests that pay in drug money. If this market was suddenly halted, it would cause devastating ripple effects throughout the country. This could threaten the Taliban’s hold on the public. People would be outraged at their loss of income, and demand restitution that the Taliban would have difficulty covering.

As their control of the country is already tenuous, banning narcotics production and trade may seem like an unnecessary risk to take. On the other hand, there may be enough negative consequences to the Taliban maintaining a narcotics industry that could convince them to stop it. This would potentially put increased regional scrutiny on the country that the Taliban will surely want to avoid. The surrounding countries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a political, economic, and security alliance between Central Asian countries (excluding Afghanistan and Turkmenistan), Pakistan, India, China, and Russia. This organisation formed in response to the terrorism and drug trafficking threats that arose out of Afghanistan in the 1990s.

Regional states grew concerned with how Afghanistan became a hotbed of terrorism that either inspired or created terrorist threats in their own countries. Afghanistan also fostered the biggest narcotics industry in history that spilled out into regional countries, bolstering criminal activity and increasing insecurity. Much of the SCO’s work centres on intelligence sharing and cooperation between security agencies in stopping drug trafficking across their borders.

Member countries will surely be concerned with an Afghan gov886 Alan Rappeport, “Afghanistan Faces Economic Shock as Sanctions Replace Foreign Aid,” ernment that not only condones trafficking, but relies on it as one of their main revenue streams. This was clearly on the minds of member states as they recently met with the Afghan government on July 14, 2021 to discuss Afghanistan gaining full membership status.890 It is uncertain how they would react to a Taliban government taking over; they still granted Pakistan full membership in 2017, despite the ISI nexus with DTOs.

But it may bring enough pressure on a Taliban government to decrease their narcotics activity. One of the superpowers of the SCO is China. The Taliban were already attempting to improve relations with China, the economic hegemon of the region, even before they took power. Despite their claim to represent the ummah against global oppression, they have recently gone quiet when it comes to the oppression of China’s Uyghur population.

The Taliban have had a long relationship with Uyghur militant organisations, like the Turkestan Islamic Party, and its predecessor the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which goes back over two decades. It may have come as a shock to many that when a senior Taliban official was asked about their position on the treatment of China’s Uyghur population, he said, “We care about the oppression of Muslims, be it in Palestine, in Myanmar, or in China, and we care about the oppression of non-Muslims anywhere in the world.

But what we are not going to do is interfere in China’s internal affairs.”891 The Taliban turned on their long-time allies in order to build a relationship with China that they likely hoped to foster when they gained control of the country.

Beijing, in turn, was hinting at their willingness to cooperate with a Taliban government if they were to take over, having called for a US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan for many years, and hosting Taliban delegations on multiple occasions, such as the 2019 Beijing visit by the head of the Taliban’s political office, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

In an early July 2021 meeting between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Li announced a consensus reached around several points. One of those points included a call to «welcome the Taliban back to the political mainstream».893 China was making clear their willingness to work with the Taliban, either as part of a shared-power government, or as the governing party of the country.

They were apparently trying to play both sides, rhetorically supporting President Ashraf Ghani, while offering to host peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. On August 29, 2021, while speaking with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the international community should establish relations with the Taliban and “guide it actively.”

He called on the United States to provide Afghanistan economic relief and humanitarian assistance to ensure its stability as it transitions to a Taliban government.

China has continued to indicate their interest in establishing relations with the Taliban and pushing for stability in the country, which they believe requires assisting the Taliban in securing their sovereignty over the country.

Beijing is most likely concerned with extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. Part of their broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPEC is an economic development project meant to increase trade and commerce between Pakistan and China.

This includes building highways, ports, investment in energy projects, improving current transportation infrastructure, building new metro systems, and overall infrastructure development to build economic 890 Ahmad Bilal Khalil, “Afghanistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2021, https://thediplomat. com/2021/07/afghanistan-and-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/.



They were already at work on the preliminary stages of bringing Afghanistan into their economic orbit before the Taliban came into power. They began construction on Taxkorgan airport, on Pamirs Plateau, northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This area borders Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, opening up the region to more commercial travel.

In addition, China now controls the Gwadar seaport in Pakistan, which also borders Afghanistan With the Taliban now in charge, China is expected to continue engagement in this project, with the Taliban likely to agree. This would be mutually beneficial: China gets to extend their economic corridor and gain access to more regional markets, while the Taliban will get economic investment to counter international sanctions from drying up their revenue.

A Taliban government will not want to be a pariah state, hence their diplomatic posture towards China. China along with the UAE are the largest consumers of the Taliban’s raw minerals, so the Taliban will not wish to cut economic ties with them.

This may impact their willingness to continue trafficking. However, China is also building a strong economic relationship with Pakistan through the CPEC, despite the clear evidence of their connection to narcotics trafficking. It is uncertain if they will place any pressure on a Taliban government to dismantle their narcotics industry.

Perhaps if they deem it a threat to the country via funding Uyghur militant groups, then they will exert their influence on the Taliban to curtail the narcotics industry. If Afghanistan is cut off from the world financially, they may be able to sustain their organisation and the country without narcotics revenue. They are on their way towards massively increasing their tax revenue as they regulate their control over the country and they have near total access to raw materials to be mined and exported. They are now able to essentially monopolise the markets in the country, cutting down their costs and decreasing their competition.

They could also rely on the CPEC expansion to provide infrastructure jobs to fill the vacuum left by the narcotics industry. Based on their plans for Pakistan, they could overhaul the Afghan economy, creating metro systems, diversifying energy production, and increasing trade opportunities. A Taliban that would oversee and approve of those kinds of changes would certainly need to be a very different Taliban than the world has seen.

While the Taliban are trying to present a picture of a relatively more moderate organisation, there may be a limit to how moderate they will go. The negatives of continuing a narcotics trade do not seem to outweigh the positives for the Taliban, at least not for the foreseeable future. This could be the start of a true narco-state, where the government not only allows drug trafficking, but enforces it.

They will also have the opportunity to either tax DTOs for their trafficking, or monopolise narcotics trafficking altogether in Afghanistan. Either way, it will boost their narcotics revenue to unseen heights. The world needs to prepare for a situation where the root of the narcotics industry can no longer be targeted directly.

In this environment, other tools will need to be employed to target the narcotics industry. Well-financed criminal organisations are highly vulnerable to infiltration of their financial network. The bigger the organisation, the longer the paper trail, which presents more opportunities 895 Sacks “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.” Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “China Has a BIG Plan for Post-U.S.

Afghanistan-and It’s Worth Billions,” The Daily Beast (New York, NY), Jul. 4, 2021, China Has a BIG Plan for Post-U.S. Afghanistan—and It’s Worth Billions. 897 Talbot “China Eyes up Afghanistan.” Fazl-e-Haider “China Has a BIG Plan.”

Bezhan, “Taliban’s Expanding ‘Financial Power.’” 166 to gather intelligence and seize assets. Recall the story in chapter 4 about how Osama bin Laden hid USD $50 million in multiple business accounts in Al Shamal Islamic Bank. A former financial officer for bin Laden, Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl, stole from al-Qaeda and went to the US for asylum testified in court, revealing information about the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa as well as details on al-Qaeda’s complex web of shell accounts to conceal their assets.

His testimony pointed US agencies towards six other high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives accounts, and shone a light on their Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI) bank laundering scheme.900 This was one al-Qaeda operative who lead to intelligence on a global terrorist financing laundering operation.

Counter-terrorist (CT) institutions can exploit the inherent financial vulnerabilities in large terrorist organisations without directly targeting the narcotics trade. Terrorist groups are, by their nature, careful with who they trust with handling finances. Groups like al-Qaeda intentionally isolate cells to avoid major intelligence leaks if a cell gets compromised.

This means they have a small number of people who handle the distribution of funds to various cells, and very few checks to the agents’ activities.

This makes it fairly easy for agents to take a cut of the distribution without anyone knowing. Corruption from financial agents is so common that many groups will overpay them for fund distribution because they expect some funds to get lifted along the way.

This presents an opportunity to cut off the organisation from the financial agent. In the case of Jamal Ahmed Al Fadl, he was only open to revealing intelligence on al-Qaeda’s assets after they discovered he stole their funds and were planning to execute him.

If CT institutions build mistrust between the financial agent and the organisation, it could lead the agent to leave the organisation, taking their financial secrets with them. One potential avenue for this is if agencies discover a way to freeze funds, say from a discovered front organisation, they can keep that information quiet.

This will put the financial agent in a difficult situation: they can admit the funds were frozen, but the organisation’s leadership could doubt their account, given how little oversight the financial agent has; or they can take from their personal wealth to make up for the shortage. Either way, the organisation is losing funding, and the financial agent is either disgruntled for having lost their funds, or is worried that the organisation could turn on them.

Both possibilities could lead the agent to turn on the organisation, providing invaluable intelligence in exchange for amnesty. Financial agents are unique in terrorist/criminal organisations, which makes them easier to target. They are less likely to be extremely ideological than other operatives. This is due to a number of factors.

Financial operatives are likely to have been with terrorist/criminal organisations for long periods. It takes a lot of experience to handle large amounts of funds and know how to launder that funding effectively, and individuals would likely have to have been in the organisation for a long period before leadership will trust them to handle their finances.

This ironically means they are less likely to be ideological. Newer recruits who are very ideological and loyal to the cause are more likely to die in both terrorist groups and DTOs. This is because they are more likely to volunteer for suicide bombings or militant operations. Those who have stuck around for a long time likely have because they have avoided dangerous activity.901 They are also more likely to be motivated by money.

Criminal organisations usually trust money laundering to operatives who have some training or education in finance. This could mean a business degree, or experience operating a business. Those who are prone to those paths are likely to be at least somewhat motivated by money.

Those individuals then would be potential targets for offering financial incentives to become informants. If financial agents are able to be turned into informants, not only does this open the organisation up to further asset freezes, but it deprives them of the funds that only that agent had access to. This approach can work for drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) as well, 900 Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida, 03 CV 06978 (RCC), AMENDED RICO STATEMENT Applicable to Dar Al Maal Al Islami Trust, and DMI Administrative Services, S.A. (US District Court Southern District of New York. June 15, 2004). 901 Jacob N. Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies: A Rational Choice Perspective,” In Terrorism Financing and State Responses, edited by Harold Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo, Chapter 4, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, March 2007). 167 that are increasingly decentralised in their operations but centralised in their financing. Compromising a small number of financial agents can completely cripple major international criminal organisations.

One way to target narcotics trafficking is to go after the front companies. As explained in chapter 4, narcotics trafficking often involves laundering funds through licit enterprises to make the revenue appear legal. Real estate investment has become a popular method for laundering, especially in South Asia and the Gulf.

Security agencies looking to target narcotics traffickers will need to identify members in their network investing in real estate acquisition and work with the state where the property is based to seize the asset. This could both lead to freezing a significant amount of assets put into the property and make it more difficult for the organisation to ‘clean’ their illicit earnings, making them more vulnerable to prosecution.

Commonly, the owner of the property is a low-level operative in the organisation who is chosen to own the front because of their clean background. This can be exploited by security agencies to pressure the owner to share intelligence on the organisation to keep their record clean. It is also probably relatively easy to identify front companies. First by comparing the business to similar businesses in the area and seeing if there is a significant disparity in revenue.

Second, by checking the assets of the owner to determine if they have enough wealth to reasonably afford the properties. Third, to analyse the returns of property or the wealth of the property owner over time, to see if there is a sudden increase. The most difficult challenge to DTOs is not making money, but spending it. If agencies make it more difficult for them to clean their illicit earnings, that will severely impact their activities.

As outlined in chapter 5, the Afghanistan-based narcotics industry is the largest global narcotics industry in the history of the world. Its tentacles reach all the way out from Oceania to North America. The supply may be rooted in Afghanistan, but it is fuelled by global consumption. Cannabis trafficking is a major industry in Afghanistan and enriches DTOs connected with the Afghanistan trafficking routes. Cannabis trafficking falls into two main categories: cannabis herb and cannabis resin. Cannabis herb is the dried cannabis flower while cannabis resin is a byproduct of the cannabis flower that contains concentrated THC, the chemical compound that produces the psychoactive effect in cannabis.

The herb is much larger than resin, meaning it is much more difficult to smuggle long distances. This is why cannabis herb is usually only trafficked intraregionally while cannabis resin is trafficked internationally. Afghanistan is the second most likely origin for cannabis resin in the world, behind only Morocco. From 2015 to 2019, Afghanistan has been reported nearly 50 times as the country of origin for cannabis resin seized around the world, accounting for 18% of all seizures.

In terms of quantity, Afghanistan is at least the third largest producer of cannabis resin, at nearly 200 tons in 2019. Afghan cannabis resin has been found frequently in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, while also showing up less commonly in Western and Central Europe.902 Pakistan and Iran are the next leading “countries of origin”, at over 150 tons and roughly 75 tons respectively.

The “country of origin” designation is significant in that it only indicates the earliest point of origin that seizing authorities can confirm. Iran reports that the majority of the cannabis seized in its territory comes from Afghanistan, so it can be surmised that cannabis that can be traced to Iran is likely to have been sourced from Afghanistan.

Both Iran and Pakistan are heavily involved in the southern and Balkan routes, and this seems to be consistent with cannabis trafficking patterns as well. Much of the cannabis found in Iran is found to have travelled from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and then from Iran on to the Caucasus and Turkey, which is a common 902 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), “Booklet 3” in World Drug Report 2020, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, June 2020), https:// wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/field/WDR20_Booklet_3.pdf. 168 path along the Balkan route. The other likely destination for cannabis via Afghanistan, Iran, and/ or Pakistan is the Arabian Peninsula, which is consistent with the southern route.

Cannabis seems to be following a similar route to opiates stemming from Afghanistan. This indicates that cannabis is a major funding source for DTOs and terrorist groups in nexus with DTOs. This should come as no surprise, given throughout this book there have been numerous cases highlighted of DTOs trafficking in both harder drugs like heroin and cocaine as well as cannabis.

While it may be difficult to regulate cannabis cultivation and distribution in Afghanistan itself, the same may not be true for destination countries. As direct counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan seem less feasible with the uncertain future for Afghanistan, a new approach will be necessary. The terror groups and DTOs that rely on narcotics sourced in Afghanistan rely even more on global demand for illicit narcotics. One pervasive trend through this examination of the ‘narcotisation’ of Afghanistan is the detrimental influence international actors have had on the country in the pursuit of securing their interests.

From the British East India Company expanding their poppy cultivation to Afghanistan to compete with Turkey and Persia in the 18th century, to the Helmand Valley damming project in the 1940s, to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent strategy to fund the mujahidin, to finally the Pakistani ISI nexus with the Taliban, state intervention in Afghanistan has been a key factor in the destabilisation of the country that has enabled the narcotics industry to thrive.

Afghanistan has been deemed ‘the graveyard of empires’ because so many states have tried and failed to control the country without considering the repercussions of their intervention. If Afghanistan is to recover, international actors will need to change the way they engage with the country. State involvement with proxies in Afghanistan needs to come to an end.

This machination has plagued Afghanistan since the Cold War. With the unfortunate disposition of existing between the US-allied Pakistan and the Soviet bloc, Afghanistan was exploited by competing interests trying to gain a foothold in the country. They could resort to narcotics trafficking or other criminal activity to fund their operations.

When states collude with non-state actors, the international community should use diplomatic pressure to discourage such alliances. It has long been an open secret that the Pakistani government, through the ISI, has worked with numerous terrorist groups and DTOs to advance their goals. They smuggled weapons to the mujahidin in the 1980s, collaborated with the Haqqani network and the Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s in building the largest smuggling pipeline in the world, engaged in narcotics trafficking through that pipeline to fund terrorist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir, like LeT and JKIF, using proxies like D-Company, and even aided in the formation of al-Qaeda, subsequently using them as a proxy for training Kashmiri militants. The Pakistani ISI has been central to the creation and expansion of the narcotics trafficking route emanating from Afghanistan, and there have been little in terms of consequences for this activity from the international community.

Perhaps from some sense of realpolitik, countries have been reticent to call out Pakistan’s clear and continuous violations of international law. However, given the extent of their involvement with DTOs and terrorist organisations as demonstrated throughout this book, it is doubtful that any strategic alliance with Pakistan outweighs the damage the ISI has done to international security.

Their involvement in regional alliances, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, could risk intelligence falling into the hands of the very actors those alliances were created to combat. If states interested in combatting the narcotics industry made clear that until Pakistan broke their nexus with DTOs and terrorist organisations, they would not engage with them on security efforts, 903 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), “Booklet 3” in World Drug Report 2021, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, June 2021), https:// www.unodc.org/res/wdr2021/field/WDR21_Booklet_3.pdf. 169 that may pressure the government to re-evaluate their alliances.

This is not a call for economic sanctions, which ultimately hurts the impoverished citizens more than the government, but some form of diplomatic pressure may incentivise Pakistan to cut off their ties with dangerous actors like the Haqqani network. Perhaps if Pakistan were to lose access to intelligence that could help them in their fight against the TTP, they may reconsider the value of maintaining their current alliances. Laissez faire banking regulations in some countries like Pakistan has enabled DTOs like D-Company to launder illicit funds through licit fronts to evade prosecution.

Too often, this activity is ignored in the pursuit of maintaining strategic alliances. It is time for the international community to reflect on the benefit of this current paradigm. When countries are not held accountable for their contribution to a global threat, that threat is allowed to persist. Exerting diplomatic pressure by calling out harmful policies can force states to hold each other accountable in the pursuit of a world resilient to drug trafficking.

In the new political climate of Afghanistan, a reevaluation of alliances is needed to combat international terrorism and the narcotics industry. The extent to which international organisations will be able to engage in development projects in Afghanistan going forward is unknown. Given the precarious environment in the country, it is more vital now than ever that future projects are informed by the right considerations.

First, all projects must be led by the local farmers/workers that the projects are seeking to benefit. Throughout this book, we have read multiple cases over the years of well-meaning projects causing more harm than benefit. In Chapter 1, we looked at how the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA) project, while intending to create more arable land for farmers, did the exact opposite, and inadvertently damaged the soil health across the country, forcing farmers into poppy cultivation to survive.

In Chapter 3, we discussed how many infrastructure projects implemented in Afghanistan have not addressed the needs of the specific communities and ended up wasting funds that would have been invaluable if applied towards needed projects. Roads were built in towns that would have rather had seed and fertiliser; farmers were given high-value crops in areas where consumers could not afford to purchase them. Local farmers should be placed in charge of agricultural projects to share their expertise on the environmental and economic factors of their area.

International organisations can provide the tools, resources, and international experts needed to implement projects, but the decision-making should be done by the local farmers and workers. No one will know more about what the local workforce needs than that workforce themselves. Throughout this book, we have explored the relationship between extremism and narcotics proliferation. The opium industry in Afghanistan evolved from a second-tier resource of the British East India Company whose production was outpaced by China, India, Turkey, and Persia to become that largest opium producer the world has ever seen in less than a century. This was all made possible by the activity of militant/extremist organisations starting with the mujahidin, who then passed the baton to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and countless other groups.

Narcotics became the currency of non-state actors who wanted a way to boost their organising power quickly and effectively. In the fallout of the Cold War, it became the method for militias to garner resources in the rapidly shifting political environment. As the activity of terrorist groups flourished in the 1970s and 1980s, they quickly shifted their fundraising methods from kidnappings and petty theft, which involved significant risk with little reward, to the safer and more profitable avenue of narcotics trafficking. They would soon discover that not only did narcotics trafficking help them fund operations, but those operations led to increased insecurity, paving the way for easier trafficking.

With the opportunities created by insecure environments, DTOs also benefited from extremist group activity, and the two industries began to collaborate and formed a resilient nexus. This nexus enabled DTOs to gain the protection of militant groups and rely on their networks for smuggling, while extremist groups profited from DTOs’ narcotics sales.

It is clear that the narcotics industry 170 is vital to extremist organisations, while extremist activity creates an environment that promotes narcotics trafficking. There is a vicious symbiosis that has benefitted both industries to the detriment of the world. While this has created a global challenge, it also presents an opportunity. If the narcotics industry can be subverted, so too can terrorist organisations. Their reliance on each other has been their strength, but it can also lead to their downfall.

If we can disrupt the illicit narcotics industry, we can severely weaken terrorist organisations. Narcotics have become the main financial resource of the majority of terrorist organisations, and without it they will have a harder time buying weapons, paying operatives, running training facilities, creating propaganda, and planning attacks. Conversely, weakened terrorist organisations will weaken DTOs. Since DTOs benefit from the insecurity that terrorist organisations provide, the reduced efficacy of terrorist organisations will make it more difficult for DTOs to operate.

State institutions will have more power and authority when unchallenged by terrorist organisations, which will allow them to secure their countries against drug trafficking more effectively. They will not need to devote as much resources to combatting or protecting against terrorist activity, freeing up more resources for counter-narcotics operations. As much as this nexus protects both industries, it binds their fate together.

This means that successful efforts to combat drug trafficking will have ripple effects that will harm both industries. The hope of this book is to call on all of us to rethink our assumptions about the solutions to the narcotics epidemic. After approaching the problem in much the same way over the course of a century, we have only seen the industry grow to unseen heights.

While it may seem at a glance that methods like burning poppy crops and arresting drug users are effective ways to combat the narcotics industry, we have decades of evidence to the contrary. A holistic approach to counter-narcotics will look at every stakeholder at every level – poppy farmers, traffickers, hawaladars, money launderers, licit front operators, extremist organisations, DTOs, drug users – and determine the most effective way to disengage them from the industry.

The method for each should be based on successful cases and methods, and take into account the specific environment that each stakeholder is operating in. Drug trafficking employs a wide variety of methods for smuggling between different locations, and a resilient counter-narcotics effort will identify shifting trends and dynamics to try to stay a step ahead of traffickers. DTOs are always innovating new ways to launder their funds, and it will be necessary to look into new ways to track this activity and subvert it.

As cryptocurrency use expands and evolves, DTOs will increasingly rely on those digital tools to evade authorities. Economic and agricultural development initiatives are key to convincing poppy farmers and other labourers involved in narcotics production to leave their industry, but these must be based on the needs of the specific communities. The continued boom of the narcotics industry is not a foregone conclusion.

The majority of the growth has taken place only in the past half century. With a thoughtful and proactive approach by governments to institute effective policies, this threat can be dismantled, and we can disrupt the crime-insecurity nexus along with it.