The Convergence of the Narcotics underworld and Extremist in Afghanistan and Pakistan and It's Global Proliferation

[Abdull Kazi]

Chapter Five

Blazing a Trail:

The Afghan Drug Trafficking Pipeline

The Northern Route

The year 2020 will be studied in history books for generations to come. The global pandemic caused by COVID-19 has paralyzed the world to an extent never seen before. Hospitals ran out of resources, businesses and schools were shut, and millions suffered and died.

The major catalyst for this was the very thing that previous generations prophesied would bring the world ultimate prosperity - globalisation. The world is now interconnected and places are easier to reach than was once thought possible. Air travel has become commonplace, and people can purchase a product online and have it be sent halfway across the world in a day.

Ultimately, this global connectivity has enabled a virus that originated in Wuhan, China to infect the entire globe in a matter of months. Globalisation is a major player in the story of narcotics proliferation as well, only this virus originated in Afghanistan. The UNODC’s World Drug Report concluded that Afghanistan accounted for 84% of the world’s opium supply from 2015-2020.

Afghan opiates have made their way to Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, Africa, Oceania, and North America. These drugs make their way across the world through a wide variety of means, from cars, to commercial fights, to cargo ships, to even mail deliveries. The heroin trafficking route can be broken down into three main pathways: the northern route, Balkan route, and southern route. Each of those routes have their own branches, and eventually 84% of the world is reached.

This chapter will examine each main pathway, the secondary pathways within them, and the most common method of trafficking for each. It should be noted UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime),

“Booklet 3” in World Drug Report 2020, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, June 2020), https:// wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/field/WDR20_Booklet_3.pdf. 98 that these routes are not mutually exclusive as well as not definitive.

These are, however, the most likely routes and methods for heroin trafficking originating from Afghanistan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the disarray in the former Soviet republics enabled a thriving narcotics market to form. This birthed the northern route, where drug traffickers in Afghanistan would work in tandem with drug traffickers in other neighbouring Central Asian countries to reach markets throughout Central Asia and Russia.

This route had been on the upswing for decades, until it reached 10% of the total opiate market in 2008. However, this route has experienced a massive decline in the past decade. In 2018, heroin seizures along the northern route accounted for only 1% of global seizures.

This could be caused by a decline in production of opium in Northern Afghanistan, where a majority of heroin along the northern route is produced. Additionally, it may indicate a reduction in local consumption. However, there seems to be a growing shift using the northern route as a waypoint to Western Europe. There have been numerous recent seizures that indicate this pattern.

In May 2019, 670 kg of heroin was seized in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany, which was discovered to have been brought from Afghanistan through Kyrgyzstan via truck with Belgium as the final destination. Another heroin seizure in November 2019 involved a northern route path that ended in Belarus for further trafficking throughout the European Union.

But to predict the new pathways that may form, it is necessary to understand the route as it has predominantly existed over the past 30 years. The northern route begins in Afghanistan, where the vast majority of heroin involved in the route is produced. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, acetic anhydride (AA) is needed to produce heroin, and is rarely produced in Afghanistan.

This chemical is predominantly smuggled into Afghanistan from Iran, making up 85% of trafficking cases from 2011 to 2014, with Pakistan being the most likely alternative. Another outlier along the northern route is the production and trafficking of heroin alternatives. Some countries along the route produce and consume a cheap substitute, called “kompot”.

This heroin alternative does contain the opium poppy, but mixes and dilutes it with other ingredients like sulfuric acid. Opium poppies are cultivated throughout the northern route, particularly Uzbekistan and Russia, for the purpose of local kompot production and consumption.

However, eradication of poppy fields in these countries has been on the decline through the 2010s, so it is likely that the region is increasingly turning towards heroin consumption. Pure heroin involved in the northern route is most likely produced in Afghanistan, and more precisely Northern Afghanistan.

Northern route trafficking generally travels through Central Asia and then on to the Russian Federation. Within the northern route, there are three branches. The first, and most commonly used, is the north-eastern route, which travels from Afghanistan onto Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and then Russia.

The second is the central route, going from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and then Russia. The final branch, which is used the least, is the north-western route, which travels from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan.

Tajikistan is the second step in both the north-eastern and central branch of the northern route, and is the prime location for trafficking through the northern route. It accounts for the highest proportion of seizures throughout Central Asia, with 34% of seizures in the period 2011-2015.

However, seizures alone do not indicate the predominance of a drug in a particular country. It is possible that an increase in law enforcement efforts could lead to an increase in the number of seizures that would give the false impression of a higher rate of drug trafficking in the country.

A good way to assess this variable is to examine the price of the drug in the country. A relatively high price compared to neighbouring countries would indicate a supply shortage, making the drug more valuable. Alternatively, a relatively low price indicates a surplus of the drug. In 2015, one kilogram of opium cost around $550 in Tajikistan.

The same amount cost $850 in neighbouring Iran. This would indicate that there is indeed a high level of opium trafficking through Tajikistan. Narcotics traffickers who intend to smuggle goods through Tajikistan are likely to purchase opiates in one of two towns in Badakhshan province that border Tajikistan: Eshashim or Shignan.

The drug sellers in the two towns have fostered a trading partnership, ensuring both locations have the necessary illicit goods for buyers based over the Tajik border.572 There are numerous trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. A majority of the Afghan-Tajik border falls along the Panj river. The land border between the two countries is controlled by numerous border checkpoints and border guard mobile units.

The eastern side of the land border traverses a mountainous region, known as the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), with a few roads along the valleys. The precarious nature of much of the border has resulted in the majority of trafficking occurring across traditional border crossings.

In the past few decades, a number of infrastructure projects in both countries were implemented as a result of international aid programs. These projects included road development between the two countries, which greatly increased legal trans-border trade.

The consequence of this, however, is it also increased illegal trans-border trafficking. Narcotics are often trafficked from Badakhshan province to Takhar province, which then get brought over the border to Tajikistan.

Another route involves a road network that links Kunduz City in Kunduz province with Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh province, Pol-e-Khumri in Baghlan province, and carries all the way to Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan has reported that the main entry points for opiates from Afghanistan are Shuroabad, Hamadoni, Farkhor, Eshkashim, and Rushan.

Border agents usually seize the narcotics directly at the border points, either by vehicle inspection, or from an Afghan courier crossing the border illegally. Additionally, many seizures are made upon inspection of cargo trucks after having crossed the border.

Once the traffickers make their way over the Tajik border, they are likely to follow two distinct paths. The first, most common, path leads through Khatlon Oblast, then follows to Dushanbe, where they may sell the narcotics to the domestic market, or they continue on the path to Khujand in northern Tajikistan, where they may veer in two directions: north to Kyrgyzstan, or west to Uzbekistan.

This route is usually traversed via car, but there has been an increase in seizures from cargo trains. It should be noted that since 2011, Uzbekistan has heavily invested in border security around the Tajik-Uzbek border, which has seemed to shift much of the trafficking along this route to Kyrgyzstan.

The second, less used route, begins in Murghab and travels through GBAO to head into Kyrgyzstan in the southeast. This latter route utilises the Pamir highway, a relic of the Soviet era, that connects directly to Kyrgyzstan.

The next stop is Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian state with the third highest amount of seizures at 17%. The majority of trafficking activity into Kyrgyzstan originates from Tajikistan, however there are also routes from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Kyrgyzstan.

The Uzbek route connects to a distribution hub based in the Kyrgyz border town Osh. The Kazakh route connects to the Bishkek distribution hub. The precarious nature of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border has led to it being the mostused crossing for traffickers through Kyrgyzstan.

The origin of this issue dates back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1991, when Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were separated from the Soviet Union, the two countries had conflicting historical claims to the territory. This conflict remains today, putting nearly half of the 971-kilometre border in contention. Central to this disagreement is the control of the village Vorukh.

This village is officially part of Tajikistan; however, it is enclaved by Kygryz territory. The villages on both sides of the border are agrarian and heavily reliant on agriculture and livestock to survive. This has led to conflicts over access to resources, such as land use and water. Some disputes have resulted in firefights between villagers on both sides of the border.

This has diverted the attention of Kyrgyz and Tajik border agents, who have needed to break up disputes between the embattled villagers. Border agents also need to secure travel through the enclaves. For instance, a Kyrgyz villager from Ravat needs to travel through Tajikistan’s Isafara region to get to the Batken district in Kyrgyzstan.

Tensions have escalated in recent years after the construction of a new road allowing Kyrgyz residents to bypass Vorukh to reach the Batken district. Tajik residents fear Kyrgyzstan can blockade the road that travels through Vorukh, cutting off Tajiks in the enclave from the rest of Tajikistan. This has led to a number of violent clashes throughout 2019.

This chaos and confusion around the borders offers drug traffickers the perfect distraction to smuggle narcotics across the border. There is a clear connection between the instability around the contentious territory and drug trafficking.

The highest level of trafficking occurs between two crossings: Khujand, Tajikistan to Isfana, Kyrgyzstan, and Isfara, Tajikistan to Batken, Kyrgyzstan. It is clear that until the two states can settle their territorial disputes, narcotics traffickers will exploit the instability to smuggle drugs through the crossing to the rest of the northern route.

Once the narcotics traffickers cross into Kyrgyzstan, they are likely to travel east, from Isfana and Batken Oblast over to Osh Oblast. This area comes with its own difficulties for border agents, as it too contains several enclaves of disputed territory, including the previously mentioned Vorukh in Tajikistan, as well as Sokh, Chongara, and Shakhimardan in Uzbekistan.

The traffickers will either seek buyers in Osh’s black market or move northeast onto the capital, Bishkek. In recent years, the city of Osh’s narcotics market has shifted to several smaller rural markets around Osh Oblast. This is likely a result of successful anti-narcotics operations, however it is uncertain if the trafficking has lessened, or has been simply been offset into multiple smaller markets.

Bishkek remains a major hub for trafficking and selling narcotics in Kyrgyzstan. As a robust transportation hub, the city is connected to Kazakhstan and Russia via several railroads and highways. This makes Kyrgyzstan a prime waypoint for trafficking onto Kazakhstan and Russia. According to UNODC’s 2015 figures, 70% of narcotics trafficked through Kyrgyzstan end up in Russia, 20% in Kazakhstan, and 10% in China.

Once in Bishkek, traffickers will either sell their product, or they will repackage it and store it for later shipment. For the drugs destined for further trafficking to Kazakhstan, and later Russia and China, they will often be handed off to other smugglers with commercial trucks. These smugglers are likely to hide the drugs in seemingly legitimate cargo.

In one case from March 2015, traffickers hid 125 kg of heroin inside furniture. They are then likely to attempt to enter Kazakhstan via Korday, Chon-Kapka, or Chalabar. In the past decade, this tactic of entering multiple waypoints to hand off to other traffickers has diminished in use. More and more traffickers are bypassing these stops altogether and smuggling the narcotics straight through to Kazakhstan by personal vehicle.

This is achieved through creative hidden compartment installations in the vehicles. In one case, a Kyrgyz citizen attempted to smuggle 10.1 kg of heroin to Kazakhstan inside the spare tire of his car.581 In another case, a truck from a Bishkek-based confectionary shop was discovered by Asena Karacalti, Everlasting or Ever-Changing? Violence Along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan Border, (Washington D.C.: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), Jun. 8, 2020),

German customs agents to have been hiding 670 kg of heroin within 532 boxes of Turkish sweets. German authorities believed that the shipment originated in Afghanistan and was en route to Belgium before it got stopped.

The border between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is made up of mostly flat plains, with only one river crossing the eastern portion. This allows for a wide area from which to traffic narcotics. To travel from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, traffickers are likely to transit through one of two hubs:

Almaty of Taraz. Data shows two-thirds of opiates are trafficked into Almaty, and one-third to Taraz. However, the trafficking to Almaty includes local market sales, so this does not necessarily indicate more trafficking into Kazakhstan occurs through Almaty. Almaty also used to be a popular hub for trafficking to Uzbekistan, however this has waned in recent years.

In the past decade, Uzbekistan has made successful efforts in increasing its border security infrastructure, weakening the trafficking efforts from Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan.583 Around 60% of heroin smuggled into Kazakhstan comes from Kyrgyzstan.

This is vastly more than the next likely origin, Tajikistan, at 15%. Of all the heroin smuggled into Kazakhstan, 60% is destined for Russia. There are two main routes for trafficking from Kazakhstan to Russia. The first path starts at Almaty or Jambyl Oblasts and travels through Karaganda Oblast, emptying out into North Kazakhstan Oblast, Pavlodar Oblast, or East Kazakhstan Oblast.

Traffickers will likely take the M-36 highway, which crosses through the Karaganda Oblast, the largest market for local distribution. Traffickers may sell some of their product there before heading towards Russia. The second path starts from South Kazakhstan Oblast and heads to one of the north-western Oblasts. These paths end up at either Kostanay Oblast or North Kazakhstan Oblast, and cross into Russia.

The most likely transit locations into Russia are Troitsk, Chelyabinsk, or Yekaterinburg. The Kazak-Russian border presents numerous opportunities for smugglers. The 7,591 km border has 46 vehicle crossings, 23 railroad crossings, five pedestrian crossings, and one river crossing. The mountains around the north-east part of the border present an opportunity for traffickers to cross where border agents have limited capacity to secure the area.

Traffickers will take advantage of high-traffic crossings, where customs agents and border guards are more likely to be too overwhelmed and distracted to notice the drugs hidden away in secret compartments in their vehicles. In 2007, Russian Border Guard Service experts reported that 70% of narcotics crossing from Kazakhstan to Russia are brought over via official checkpoints, rather than unregulated border crossings.

While this is a dated statistic, this coincides with the UNODC’s 2016 report detailing how a majority of seizures come from busy highways like the M-36, the A-1 and the M-51.587 This would mean, according to the chief of the drug control department of the Siberian Customs Service, Lt.-Col. V. V. Kalinin, traffickers are likely to smuggle small amounts of drugs on each crossing to minimise risk of detection.

While railroads crossings are used for trafficking, vehicle crossings are much more likely. This method gives traffickers more flexibility regarding transport times and can alter their route mid-journey to cross a border point with higher traffic to minimise discovery.

However, in regions with fewer roads, railroads are more common methods of trafficking. Volgograd Oblast and Astrakhan Oblast, for instance, have fewer highways, and traffickers are found to more commonly attempt to smuggle drugs via trains.

Train smuggling offers certain benefits to traffickers, as customs agents have less time to inspect passengers than they would at a vehicle crossing.

Sergey Golunov, “Drug-Trafficking through the Russia-Kazakhstan Border: Challenge and Responses,” Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia, no.14, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JP, 2007), 335. 587 UNODC, Northern Route, 86. 588 Golunov, “Russia-Kazakhstan Border,” 337-338.

Traffickers crossing from Kazakhstan to Russia have been found to use a variety of methods to conceal their product. Those who travel via truck are likely to conceal narcotics in licit goods shipments, such as vegetables, industrial material, or raw material.

Traffickers in trucks or personal vehicles may hide their product in hidden compartments in the vehicle, such as a secret compartment in the trunk, glove compartment, etc. or in the wheels of the vehicle. Narcotics are also often hidden on the smuggling individual themselves, under their clothes, in their luggage, or they may even swallow the contents.

Within the Russian Federation, traffickers are likely to travel through one of three major hubs: Moscow, Perm-Yekaterinburg, and Novosibirsk-Irkutsk. From these hubs, narcotics are trafficked throughout Russia as well as onto other markets in Europe.

The Moscow hub is the largest of the three hubs, with significant local consumption, as well as trafficking to other areas throughout Russia and potentially on to Europe. This is facilitated through the highly developed transportation infrastructure in the region, with numerous highways and railroads for trafficking by vehicle as well as by train.

Narcotics trafficked through Russia do not only come from Central Asia. The Caucasus are also a prime region for narcotics trafficking that involves the Russian Federation. This route starts in Afghanistan, and likely travels through Iran, then on through the Caucasus, which will include travelling through Azerbaijan before reaching Russia.

This sub-route is related to the Balkan route, which will be covered later in this chapter, but it is important to note that these routes are not mutually exclusive, and may bleed into each other.591 Having detailed one full branch of the northern route, it is necessary to outline the other prominent branches within this route.

The second most trafficked country within Central Asia is Uzbekistan, with 20% of all drug seizures. Uzbekistan is uniquely positioned to border every other Central Asian country, as well as Afghanistan. This means that where the drug route is concerned, Uzbekistan can be involved in a multitude of pathways. Most available data supports that the most common route for narcotics to enter Uzbekistan is through Tajikistan, however some organisations, like the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), have argued a higher quantity has come directly from Afghanistan.

Uzbek officials have identified three main entry-points from Tajikistan. The first point is called the east-west axis. This path involves traffickers travelling from the Tajik region containing Dushanbe, Hisor, and Tursunzade and crossing over to the Uzbek region containing Shargun, Uzun, and Denov. The second point is from Panjakent, Tajikistan to Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The third entry point is between Khujand, Tajikistan and Bekabad, Uzbekistan.

The Tajik-Uzbek border suffers from a similar situation that plagues the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Until 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the border consisted of an administrative line in official documents, but without any physical demarcation. In the 30 years since, the Tajik-Uzbek border has had more success in creating an agreed-upon physical boundary than the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, but there are still some issues.

In the Soviet era, many villages formed along the border, with families and ethnic groups positioned on both sides of the line. These ties remain to this day, making strict control along parts of the border difficult. Across the Tajik-Uzbek border, trafficking usually occurs by road. However, as Uzbekistan has ramped up their border security over the last decade, there has been an increasing diversification of smuggling methods.

The prominence of families living on both sides of the Tajik-Uzbek border presents an opportunity for traffickers to create family networks to traffic through the villages that straddle the border. The Afghan-Uzbek border is the most heavily guarded in Uzbekistan. The entire 137 km border is secured with a doubled, electrified barbed wire fence, with minefields positioned throughout the border.

Uzbekistan has constructed a significant number of watchtowers equipped with radio communications to oversee the border, with thousands of guards stationed throughout. The primary crossing is the Hairaton Border Crossing Point, which is located on a bridge crossing the Abu Darya river across from Afghanistan’s Kaldar district.

In addition to the high number of border guards overseeing the border, the Uzbek army is deployed to provide additional security. Given the high security, any narcotics that are smuggled directly from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan are likely to travel across the Amu Darya river and enter Surxondaryo Oblast in Uzbekistan. Traffickers will often attempt to smuggle narcotics across the river on small boats, needing to evade Uzbek border agents who routinely patrol the river on boats themselves. Compared to neighbouring countries, Uzbekistan seizures are likely to contain much higher quantities of heroin.

The largest heroin seizure in the world in 2010 took place in Uzbekistan at the Oybek vehicle crossing from Tajikistan. Another high-volume seizure occurred in 2011 in Samarkand, with the traffickers en route from Tajikistan and heading for Russia. These high-volume seizures are very rare in Tajikistan, and almost nonexistent in the rest of Central Asia.

This indicates that multiple trafficking cells may be combining several smaller shipments from various countries in Tajikistan before travelling onto Uzbekistan to transit on to larger markets, like Russia. Uzbekistan’s recent border security improvements present a success story that should be studied further for wider implementation.

The country has invested significantly in border infrastructure, including frequent watchtower installations, and modern technology, such as biometric scanners, for use in major checkpoints. Most significantly, border agents are highly trained and well-paid, reducing the likelihood of bribery enabling smugglers to cross illegally

Narcotics transiting through Uzbekistan are most likely to head through Kazakhstan next. Trafficking usually occurs via two routes. The first travels from Tashkent Oblast and then onto Shymkent Oblast, which has a large Uzbek community as a remnant of the Soviet era. This community enables significant cross-border trade, some of which includes illicit trading of narcotics.

The other route begins in Karakalpakstan, which is situated in north-west Uzbekistan, and then travels to Mangistau Oblast, Kazakhstan. These drugs either end up in Kazakhstan, or head to the final destination of Russia. The second most likely trafficking waypoint from Uzbekistan is Turkmenistan.

The Uzbek-Turkmen border is 1,621 km long, made up of mostly flat plains and deserts that are sparsely inhabited outside of nomadic tribes. Although trafficking data from the Turkmen side is limited, seizures on the Uzbek side near the Turkmen border indicate a prominent path.

While it used to be a prominent belief that Turkmenistan was not central to the northern route, seizure data over the past decade has indicated that it has become a waypoint for significant shipments. Uzbek law enforcement have interdicted heroin shipments between 20-30 km, which indicates wholesale transactions to be shipped onto larger markets, instead of local, small-scale consumption.

One trafficking route UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), Opiate Flows through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, Jan. 26, 2012), 11. 595 UNODC, Northern Route, 80. 596 UNODC, Opiate Flows, leads from Tajikistan into the Surkhandarya Region of Uzbekistan, then through Horezm Region and Karakalpakstan, before heading onto Turkmenistan.

About half of Turkmenistan’s seizures in 2011 took place near the Karshi-Nukus route in Uzbekistan, which shows that Turkmenistan is becoming a prominent branch of the drug route through Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is only one of multiple origins for trafficking through Turkmenistan, however. Smugglers seem to be more likely to head directly from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan than to travel through Uzbekistan.

This is especially true in recent years after Uzbekistan increased their border security protections. Another probable leg in the journey to Turkmenistan is Iran. A significant number of seizures have taken place along the Iran-Turkmenistan border. The most likely entry point is up through northern Iran and across the Mary-Turkmenbashi axis.

Within Turkmenistan, trafficking usually crosses east to west along the Mary-Turkmenbashi axis, before finally crossing over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. As mentioned previously, this part of the northern route blends with the Balkan route, and branches of one often cross into the other.





The Balkan Route



The Balkan route is the largest heroin trafficking route in the world. It has been used in heroin trafficking since the 1980s, if not earlier. In 2018, the heroin trafficked through this route made up 58% of all heroin trafficked outside of Afghanistan.

However, in light of the increase in border restrictions in the region following the COVID-19 pandemic, trafficking seems to be on the decline through the Balkan route, at least temporarily. One indication of this is the marked increase in opiate seizures in the Indian Ocean. This seems to indicate traffickers are seeking to circumvent the Balkan route by trafficking through Africa onto the global market.

This is a trend that researchers will need to study further once the pandemic has subsided and travel and trade restrictions ease. The Balkan route, like the other trafficking routes, begins in Afghanistan, but the first leg of the journey begins in Iran.

From Iran, the narcotics are generally trafficked through Turkey, then through the Balkans, before emptying out in Europe for sale in the global market. The Balkan route has three branches: the northern branch, the western branch, and the southern branch.

The northern branch traverses the Eastern Balkans, such as Bulgaria and Romania, and then travels north towards Western and Central Europe. The western branch passes through the western Balkans, which can include North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, before reaching the European market.

This branch could involve both land and sea transit. The southern branch travels through Greece to enter the Schengen Area of Europe, usually via Italy. As with the northern route, these branches are not mutually exclusive, and may intersect and change directions. However, through analysing the tendency of traffickers to use these particular pathways, it will be easier to understand the dynamics involved in trafficking through the Balkan route.

The Illicit Proceeds of Opiates Trafficked on the Balkan Route, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, 2015), 20-21. 105 Iran is the first stop in the trafficking routes of both the Balkan and southern routes. An estimated 31% of opiates leaving Afghanistan enter Iran through the 921 km border. Its importance is highlighted by the fact that most of the opium seizures in Afghanistan occurred in the regions bordering Iran and/or Pakistan.

Both countries are key to a majority of global trafficking, however Pakistan is more central to the southern route while Iran is key to both routes. Pakistan is marginally involved in the Balkan route as a potential waypoint to Iran, however the vast majority of narcotics that are trafficked through Pakistan go on to follow the southern route.

Traffickers using the Balkan route usually travel directly west from Afghanistan to Iran, then to Turkey and through the Balkans. Narcotics entering Iran are usually pushed through western Afghanistan in Nimroz province. If the drugs are destined for the Balkan route, they will likely then head northwest, and if they are for the southern route they will head south towards the coast.

For the Balkan route, traffickers will either enter Khorasan province and travel west, or enter Sistan and Baluchestan province and travel northwest to cross into Turkey. East West Institute, “Iran and the Border with Afghanistan:

Going at It Alone,”

Afghan Narcotrafficking



The State of Afghanistan’s Borders (2015), Authorities from Iran have reported drug seizures of relatively high volume compared to other countries in the Balkan route, which indicates Iran is a key hub for large-scale trafficking efforts, both in the Balkan and southern routes. Due to the prominence of Iran in the drug trafficking route, the country has taken extreme measures to combat trafficking.

Iran allocates almost a billion USD to border control infrastructure, including the construction of security barriers around its border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. This includes 400 km of embankments, 800 km of deep canals, 39 km of concrete walls and barriers, and 140km of barbed-wire fencing. Iran has stationed several thousands of guards along this border and deployed 3,000 army troops to the borders to aid in counter-narcotics operations.

They have launched several counter-narcotics operations, many of which were deadly. Over the past 30 years, 4,000 law enforcement officials were killed and over 12,000 officials were maimed in counter-narcotics operations.

Iran has also been open to working with intergovernmental organisations, like the UNODC, to adopt best-practices in counter-narcotics efforts, as well as engaging in joint task forces and regional intelligence sharing efforts to improve regional security.

This included a joint training programme in 2007 with Afghanistan and Pakistan run by the UNODC which facilitated the adoption of compatible telecommunications equipment, improved intelligence sharing, and liaison offices at key border crossings.

Iran also worked with the UNODC in 2014 to adopt new border security practices, including placing drug-sniffing dogs at border points and introducing a new training programme for customs officials on interdiction practices.

The country has continued to increase regional cooperation efforts, like joining the Trilateral Initiative with Pakistan and Afghanistan, which placed two border liaison offices in Taybad and Mirjaveh, which are close to the Islam Qaa-Zaranj crossing parallel to the Afghan-Iranian border.

These measures have led to relative success in seizures when compared with neighbouring countries. In 2012, Iran seized 68% of total opiates seized in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan, including Afghanistan itself. However, Iran’s intensified security measures around its border with Afghanistan has led to draconian measures regarding migrants.

In one incident on April 30, 2020, around 50 migrants travelling from Afghanistan to Iran were arrested, beaten, and forced into the Hariroud river, leading to several drownings. This approach is clearly doing significant harm that may create more problems than it solves. In 2018, 62% of the total opiate seizures in Europe occurred in Turkey. 95% of opiates seized in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe took place in Turkey.

Turkey clearly holds a lot of significance as the central hub of the Balkan route. This is also evidenced in the amount of seizures along the route. The bulk of opiates were also seized from Turkey (excluding Iran, which is part of both the Balkan and southern routes), with 19 tons seized from Turkey, three tons from Balkan countries, and nine tons in Western and Central Europe.

This indicates a clear trajectory from Turkey, through the Balkan states, and then onto Central and Western Europe as the likely final destination. As the narcotics are trafficked through the route, the amounts drop off from sales in local markets and disbursement along different route branches. This is why Turkey has the largest amount, as the beginning of the route.

The Balkan state seizures are also smaller in comparison to Western and Central Europe. This is likely because those are larger markets, and the Balkan states operate mostly as transit countries to reach the major narcotics markets. UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), The 2000s marked an era of improving economic relations between Iran and Turkey, which may have indirectly boosted the drug trade between the two countries.

When the AKP administration began in 2002, they focused heavily on improving regional trade, signing free-trade agreements and eliminating trade barriers. This included two comprehensive trade and energy agreements between Turkey and Iran in 2007 and 2008. The trade agreements led to a 144% increase in bilateral trade between 2005 and 2010.

The improved economic relations between the two countries also led to an increase in travel between the countries. Iranian passenger travel to Turkey increased 96% from 2004 to 2010 and vehicle traffic from Iran to Turkey increased 102% in the same period. While this improved economic relationship seems to carry some benefit to the countries, it has been accompanied by an increase in drug trafficking.

The Turkish Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (Kaçakçılık ve Organise Suçlarla Mücadele Dairesi Başkanlığı, KOM) observed that the number of vehicles that were stopped for drug trafficking increased by 31 times, with the majority coming from Iran.

These cars carried heroin, meth, opium, and/or cannabis. Many of these crossings were legal commercial vehicles transporting licit goods who were coerced into smuggling narcotics by traffickers. In descending order of likelihood, smugglers hid the drugs on their person, in their vehicles, in commercial goods, or in suitcases. Out of all drug interdictions from 2005-2010, the vast majority were individuals unaffiliated with organised crime, at 76.5%, and 23.5% were linked to organised crime syndicates.

This does not necessarily mean there were not small cells of drug smugglers working together; only that they were not associated with criminal narcotics syndicates. Counter-narcotics officers also Behsat Ekici and Ali Unlu, “Increased Drug Trafficking from Iran Ankara’s Challenges,” Middle East Quarterly 20, no. 4. (September 2013): 41-48. 108 noticed a trend occurring around 2008 where cannabis and opium seizures fell while methamphetamine and heroin seizures rose.

This tracks with the growth in the heroin trade internationally and the increase in heroin processing centres in places like Iran. Near the end of the 2000s, high-volume seizures rose while small seizures fell.

This is a strong indication of the growing sophistication in trafficking operations as trade increased. During the same period, the proportion of traffickers who smuggled drugs on their person decreased, with a corresponding increase in vehicle and parcel concealment.

The growth in free trade led to a high-frequency in commercial truck transit across the Iranian-Turkish border. This was the perfect cover for narcotics traffickers who would use the trucks to stash high volumes of opiates for wholesale distribution.

As traffickers heading from Iran to Turkey shifted their smuggling to commercial trucks, they innovated new, creative ways to conceal large quantities of heroin. This usually involved hiding the narcotics within whichever licit goods they were carrying as cover for their illicit trading.

In one seizure on December 5, 2018, authorities uncovered 1.2 tons of heroin hidden inside the meat and organs of animal carcasses. In another case on January 23, 2019, a truck heading from Iran to Turkey was discovered to be hiding 1.5 tons of heroin inside blocks of marble.

Traffickers heading through the Balkan route are not limited to travelling solely from Iran to Turkey. A recent development in the Balkan route involves trafficking through Iraq and Syria. After the Arab Spring and the subsequent destabilisation of the countries, including the growth of ISIS, many narcotics syndicates saw an opportunity.

Drug trafficking organisations began to smuggle drugs from Iran through Iraq and Syria en route to Turkey and then the rest of the Balkan route towards Europe. Recent reports of heroin seizures in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey have been traced to Iraq.

In 2013, Turkish authorities seized 266 kg of heroin that they discovered had been smuggled through Habur Border Gate from Northern Iraq. Narcotics that enter Iraq from Iran are likely to be trafficked through two main routes: via Basrah Province in the south, or via Kermanshah province in the west of Iran into Erbil province in northern Iraq. There have also been seizure cases that suggest trafficking from Syria.

One case in May 2017 involved the seizure of 102 kg of heroin in Kilis, Turkey, just near the Syrian border.622 In addition to trafficking Afghan poppies through Iraq towards the Balkan route, there is evidence of opium poppy cultivation in Iraq itself. The International Narcotics Control Board’s Annual Report in 2018 identified numerous cases of poppy cultivation.

This cultivation is likely taking place along the Euphrates River, as the majority of Iraq is too arid for poppies. This could make the Balkan route resilient to efforts to limit cultivation in Afghanistan. Iraq presents an alternative source for narcotics traffickers, and its use may grow in years to come.

The Balkan route has attracted large narcotics syndicates, many of whom work together to traffic large quantities of heroin through the route and are then sold from high-yield destination countries like Austria and Germany.

Most of these syndicates are based in Turkey, with links to other organised crime groups based along the Balkan route, such as Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Romanian groups. This nexus of organisations controls most if not all elements of the heroin supply chain, such as heroin suppliers and processors. They install licit business fronts in countries along the route, like Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, western Balkan states, Germany, the Netherlands, and all the way to the United Kingdom.

These fronts enable cover for their illegal activity, often taking the form of import/export businesses of various materials, while concealing the narcotics in commercial trucks or in the licit goods themselves.

Counter-narcotics investigators uncovered one of these operations in 2014, that operated out of North Macedonia. Nearly 400 suspects were arrested and investigators seized 100 kg of heroin, along with some cocaine and cannabis.

They also seized 4 tons of drug-cutting agents, which is evidence of how sophisticated this cell was. This cell had a structured hierarchy, where the narcotics were trafficked through multiple regions with a number of operatives assigned to specific regions and routes.

The low-level operatives were kept in the dark on the larger organisational structure, and only knew the operatives they interacted with directly along the route. In addition to their main headquarters in North Macedonia, the group held bases of operations in Austria and Germany, where they would initiate widespread distribution throughout Europe.

Once they reach Turkey, Balkan route traffickers have a variety of branches and methods of travel along the route towards Western and Central Europe. As previously outlined, the three main branches of the Balkan route are the northern, central, and southern branches.

The northern and central branches are most likely entirely overland, while the southern branch employs the use of maritime ports via ferries to Greece, Albania, or Italy.

The UNODC’s Drugs Monitoring Platform collected reports of seizures from 2015 to mid-2019 in the Balkan route to gain insight into the likely paths. Significant numbers of seizures have occurred in every South East European country, showing that every country in the Balkans is a potential stop along the route. In addition to the variety of landroute passages, maritime transport seems to be a popular method of trafficking.

A large proportion of seizures occurred along the coasts of Albania, Montenegro, Croatia, Greece, and Slovenia. As mentioned previously, seizures in most Balkan countries themselves have been pretty low.

The combined annual seizures from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia only amounted to 865 kg on average from 2015-2017. The seizure average is significantly higher in destination countries along the route.

The combined annual seizures from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom over the same time period was on average 3.8 tons a year. Given the high level of seizures in Greece and Italy, this gives further evidence of the prominence of maritime trafficking along the Balkan route.

Once traffickers get to by land Turkey, many of them will ship their drug supply to Greece, which brings them into the Schengen zone with access to the rest of the Schengen countries in the EU without needing to worry about border checks. Outside of Turkey, the other major hubs of the Balkan route are the Netherlands and Belgium.

Over 75% of the opiates that enter both the Netherlands and Belgium are trafficked into other countries. The Netherlands, in particular, holds significant importance in the Balkan route, supplying 4.7 tons of heroin a year to the European market. Trafficking to the Netherlands does not always take place via Turkey.

Traffickers will often use maritime shipment straight from the origin of the narcotics (likely Afghanistan or Pakistan) and directly to the Netherlands to reach the European market. The Port of Rotterdam in particular has been a prominent destination for both heroin and cocaine trafficking.

On February 23, 2021, the Dutch police seized their largest haul to date of 1.5 tons of heroin, found hidden within a salt shipment from Pakistan at the Port of Rotterdam. Dutch authorities in collaboration with the UK’s National Crime Agency were able to trace the origins of the shipment to drug syndicates based in Pakistan.

The main destinations of narcotics trafficked through the Netherlands are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. This highlights another layer of complexity in the Balkan route, as Germany and Austria are waypoints in the Balkan route towards the Netherlands, but also act as destination countries from the Netherlands.

An important factor in the Balkan route is what’s known as the reverse Balkan route. This is when acetic anhydride (AA) is trafficked the opposite direction through the Balkan route from Europe towards Afghanistan. Narcotics syndicates use licit front businesses to purchase AA from legitimate companies registered in the EU.

They will then use the same pathways back through the Balkan route, often trading AA for heroin from smugglers travelling along the normal Balkan route. This growth in AA along the route is evidenced by Turkey’s growing AA seizure data through the 2000s and 2010s. In December 2013, 14 tons of AA were seized in Turkey.

In May 2017, Turkish authorities seized 210 kg of AA in Baskale, Van province, which is near the border of Iran. In May 2019, 65 kg of AA was seized in Yuksekova, Hakkari province, Turkey. This town was close to the borders of both Iran and Iraq. This all indicates a flow of AA from the Balkan route, through Turkey, and back towards Afghanistan to process opium poppies into heroin. The rapid growth in seizures by year shows how quickly this market is growing.

Turkey’s 2017 AA seizures amounted to 23,000 kg, while their 2018 seizures rose 61% to 38,000 kg.631 Excluding a probable lull from the impact of COVID-19, this trend towards AA trafficking along the reverse Balkan route is likely to increase over time. While the Balkan route is still the most used of the three trafficking routes, its use is waning with the growth of the southern route.

Excluding Pakistan and Afghanistan, seizures along the southern route accounts for 6% of total heroin and morphine seizures across the globe in 2018. This is double the amount in 2015, showing how quickly this route is growing.

Balkan route traffickers are also taking advantage of parts of the southern route to circumvent the more highly-secured areas of the Balkan route. In 2016, Turkish authorities reported evidence of maritime trafficking into Turkey from the Makran Coast, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, which are all contingents of the southern route.

Traffickers are likely using maritime travel to avoid the high-security land borders of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Once they reach Turkey by sea, they can complete travel along the Balkan route.

Certain countries that used to be exclusively supplied by the Balkan route are getting a growing proportion of narcotics from the southern route. The UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all receive a significant amount of their opiates from the southern route. As of 2012, 84% of narcotics in the UK came directly from Pakistan.

A British Border Force official has confirmed this trend, tracking the growth in Pakistani trafficking to the UK through monitoring cash couriers arriving from the UK to Pakistan. Couriers are typically unwitting accomplices who are told to deliver an envelope to a contact in Pakistan in exchange for a paid trip to Pakistan.

The couriers are often poor and vulnerable Pakistani UK migrants who could not afford a trip back to Pakistan on their own, so they agree to delivering these envelopes in order to visit family or attend a wedding. This method is used to pay for large consignments of heroin or methamphetamines, which is becoming increasingly popular.

These shifts speak to a larger change in global narcotics trafficking. Balkan route countries are improving their border security and their counter-narcotics measures. In response, drug trafficking organisations are diversifying their routes to avoid the high-security areas. This is leading to an increase in the use of the southern route, as well as further blending of the southern route and the Balkan route.

Drug traffickers are likely to increase their reliance on the southern route, as well as include more parts of the southern route in their Balkan route trafficking. EMCDDA, “EU Drug Markets Report,” 83-84. 631 UNODC, Early Stages of the Balkan Route, 7. 632 UNODC, “Booklet 3” in World Drug Report 2020, 18. 633 UNODC, Early Stages of the Balkan Route, 6. 634 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), The Illicit Drug Trade Through South-Eastern Europe, (Vienna, AT: UNODC, March 2014), 14-15. 635 Interview with British Border Force official. January





The Southern Route



A significant element to the growth of the southern route is the influence of Pakistani narcotics syndicates. Many of these syndicates have established a foothold in European destination markets, like the United Kingdom and Spain, and smuggle heroin directly from Pakistan to these destination countries via maritime shipment. Large seizures in the UK of containers holding over 200 kg from Pakistan is not uncommon.

Pakistani groups may be trying to compete with Turkish-based groups that hold significant power in the narcotics business as a major hub for the southern and Balkan routes. By using maritime shipping from Pakistan, they circumvent Turkey entirely and head straight for lucrative markets in Europe.636 The southern route provides multiple benefits to traffickers compared to the other main trafficking routes.

Given the prominence of the Balkan route and its limitation to overland travel, it is relatively easier to patrol and secure against smuggling. The southern route’s use of maritime travel gives traffickers more varied options for travel and more cover from authorities. The southern route is unique among the three major trafficking routes, in that it supplies narcotics for by far the widest array of countries in several regions around the world.

The northern route serves primarily Central Asia and Russia, and the Balkan route serves a large proportion of Europe, but the southern route serves Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Oceania, and North America.637 Because of its reach, the southern route is much less clear-cut than the other main routes, with more variability in waypoints and travel methods. The route often combines land, sea, mail, and/ or air travel to reach its many destinations.

UNODC, Illicit Drug Trade, 14-15. 637 UNODC, Southern Route, 10. 112 The southern route begins in Pakistan or Iran and travels by sea through the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and/or North America. Traffickers start in either Pakistan or Iran and use the Makran Coast to enter the Gulf of Oman or the Persian Gulf to start their nautical journey. Heroin exported via this route is of very high purity compared to other routes, indicating the heroin is at the beginning of its journey and hasn’t passed through many smugglers yet.

The shipment will likely pass through the Arabian Peninsula, passing through Gulf countries like the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman, and supplying local markets there before continuing on the path through East Africa. The path also diverges north through the Red Sea to include markets in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.638 The southern route has introduced a new strain of opiate to the global market called “organic meth.” This kind of meth uses the ephedra plant as a precursor for methamphetamine, instead of the traditional chemical precursors. This new strain started appearing in 2018 after the drought in Afghanistan led to the destruction of poppy fields around the country. This organic meth was produced as an alternative to heroin, and soon a number of extraction sites were formed in Afghanistan, primarily in Bakwa, Farah Province.

The Taliban and Haqqani network have been particularly involved in the production of this new drug, but their capacity to produce high quality organic meth is low. They have instead sent the plants and opiates to labs in Pakistan with better equipment, which have been able to produce very high-quality methamphetamines.

The Middle East and the Gulf are a major branch of the southern route. This region is connected to both the Balkan and southern routes, but a majority of its supply comes from the southern route. Most southern route trafficking into the region comes via sea, at 66% of all trafficking cases. Traffickers will take advantage of the numerous commercial shipping ports that are protected from customs inspections.

Seizures in the region are clustered in Israel, southern Syria, and northern Jordan. It is unknown if most of the traffickers in these locations are part of integrated cells, or if there are separate trafficking efforts in each country. There are some cases of seizures in Jordan that were headed for Israel, so some overlap is present.

There have also been interdiction cases in Egypt that came from the Red Sea, showing the inclusion of Red Sea travel from the Makran Coast origins of the southern route.640 Narcotics shipments to the Gulf usually arrive in large consignments by sea. This is likely to come from Pakistan in either a ship or a dhow, which is a traditional sailing vessel commonly used in the Indian Ocean for traders.

Dhows are motorised wooden ships that range from 15-23 metres made for fishing at sea. Their size is large enough to handle rough waters of the sea, but small enough to stay under the radar of security vessels or satellite images. Traffickers also benefit from the storage compartments commonly found on dhows that are large enough to effectively hide up to 1000 kg of heroin, while maintaining plausibility as a fishing vessel.

The countries in the Middle East and Gulf most likely to receive narcotics by sea are the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. These consignments are then broken down into smaller portions to be sent to a variety of destinations through a variety of methods. This includes air, mail, and sea travel. Once in the Middle East and Gulf, southern route trafficking is likely to go to Africa, Europe, East Asia/ Southeast Asia, or North America, in descending order.642 The next likely method of trafficking through the Middle East and Gulf is by air.

Consignments flown to the Gulf usually come from Afghanistan, Nigeria, or Pakistan, and usually land in Saudi 638 EMCDDA, “EU Drug Markets Report,” 86. 639 Interview with official from the Australian Border Force, Dec. 9, 2020. 640 UNODC, Southern Route, 57-58. 641 Joseph Hanlon, “The Uberization of Mozambique’s Heroin Trade,” Department of International Development, (London, UK: London School of Economics, July 2018), 10. 642 UNODC, Southern Route, 59-60. 113 Arabia, the UAE, or Oman.

However, there have not been significant records in Oman showing seizures of heroin from Pakistan. There are, however, records of seizures in Pakistan that were headed for Oman. This could indicate undetected trafficking in Oman that successfully makes its way to the next location.

The third most likely method for trafficking through the Middle East and Gulf is by land.

One likely path is through Israel, Syria, and Jordan. Another path begins in Iraq and moves through a variety of pathways. Traffickers may move through Iraq to Kuwait via the Safwan-Abdali border crossing. To cross from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, traffickers are likely to sneak themselves across the Ar Ar border crossing.

Finally, to cross from Iraq to Syria, traffickers are likely to cross through Rabia, Iraq.644 The country in the Middle East and Gulf most likely to be trafficked from is the UAE. This is due to the high volume of maritime shipments that pass through the country, enabling smugglers to blend into normal commercial transit. The major ports of export in the UAE are Khor Fakkan Container Terminal in Sharjah and the two ports in Dubai, Mina Rashid and Jebel Ali Port.

Trafficking is aided by the free trade zones in these ports that allow ships to depart without needing to pass a customs inspection. Traffickers will take advantage of this to smuggle large consignments of heroin through their ships by hiding them within licit trading goods.

In one case in June 2012, 20 kg of heroin hidden inside carpets was discovered in Côte d’Ivoire. Investigators found that the consignment came from the UAE and was en route to Ghana. One major trafficking case in May 2014 involved 764 kg of heroin being trafficked by ship from Iran, then stopping at a dock in the UAE before finally arriving in Rotterdam, the Netherlands where it was seized by authorities. Another case demonstrates how long a southern route path can be from start to finish.

In April 2011, a consignment of 202 kg was shipped by sea from Karachi, Pakistan, and made stops in Salalah, Oman, Valencia, Spain, Lome, Togo, and finally arrived in Benin where it was seized. This shows the primacy of maritime trafficking for the southern route, and how it enables wide reach throughout the world, starting in south Asia and making its way to the Gulf, Europe, and all the way to West Africa.

Trafficking by air from the Middle East and Gulf is less common than by sea, but still very prevalent. Traffickers intentionally use indirect travel patterns to obscure their intended destination and to not arouse suspicion. This often involves making several stops to different regions before heading to the intended final destination.

Many traffickers heading from Afghanistan or Pakistan will stopover in the Middle East and Gulf before heading to Europe or Africa. Qatar and the UAE are common stopovers en route to countries like Spain or Nigeria. Traffickers operating in the Middle East and Gulf will also often travel to their intended destinations by plane.

Multiple cases of trafficking have been attempted through air travel from the UAE and Qatar to China, either directly or via Hong Kong. While only 14% of trafficking attempts are from this region, trafficking by air is still a significant issue, and more efforts need to be made to increase interdiction.647 The next major region in the southern route is South Asia. While only a small proportion of the South Asian population uses opiates, the size of the population and proximity to the origin of opiate production makes it a prime target for traffickers.

India is central to the trade in this region, acting as both a transit point onto the global market, a producer for local consumption,643 Ibid., 61. 644 Ibid., 63. 645 Ibid., 62. 646 Ibid. 647 Ibid. 114 and a destination for trafficking.

Recent figures show that 45% heroin found in India comes from Afghanistan, while 54% is produced locally. The domestic production seems to be from illicit cultivation, and not related to the licit cultivation of poppies grown for the pharmaceutical industry. While there are some cases of Indian sourced heroin found in other countries in South Asia, like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the vast majority of the heroin found there originates from Afghanistan.

As in the Balkan route, AA is a growing issue in the southern route. This, in part, stems from the licit production of AA in India for use in pharmaceutical, textile, and chemical factories. There have been a number of incidents where Indian authorities shut down heroin and morphine labs that used locally-sourced AA.

This precursor is likely trafficked via container trucks disguised as licit liquid materials, like engine oil.649 India is not only a popular transit point for the southern route, but a lucrative market in its own right. One kilogram of heroin in Pakistan is worth about USD $2,000, but once it crosses the border into India, that price shoots up to over USD $30,000.

Local consumption of opiates is usually in the form of chitta, a drug made from mixing heroin with a number of synthetic substances. This drug is especially popular in Punjab, where it’s quickly becoming an epidemic. The drug is widely popular among a variety of demographics, across all economic levels. The addictive nature of the drug creates an opportunity for traffickers to exploit their clientele.

Given how expensive and addicting chitta is, many consumers have a higher dependency than they can afford. Traffickers use this leverage to recruit their addicted clients to the business. It works like a pyramid scheme, where the dealer gets the client hooked, and then offers them 1 gram of heroin for every ten they sell.

The addicted traffickers are actually reliable to the network, as they are unlikely to be tempted to become an informant and lose out on their drug supply. These addicts are also used as drug mules to move the drugs out to new markets throughout the country. Opiates trafficked from Pakistan to India are likely to be smuggled through western states that border Pakistan, like Punjab or Haryana.

Traffickers have created clever methods of smuggling the drugs across the border. For instance, in April 2013, traffickers utilised a plastic pipe to try to sneak 31.8 kg of heroin from the Pakistan side of the border into India.651 These efforts are facilitated by trafficking networks that are well-coordinated on both sides of the border.

Indian couriers will advise the Pakistani trafficker where the security weak-points are along the border to evade security. Smugglers are also likely to traverse the multiple rivers and streams that cross the Indo-Pak border.652 Another common method is by rail. In 2012, Indian authorities uncovered one of their largest seizures of 105 kg being smuggled on a rail line going from Pakistan to India.

There have also been cases of maritime trafficking from Pakistan to India. In May 2019, a Pakistani fishing boat trafficking heroin was interdicted by the Indian Coast Guard off the Jakhau coast in Gujarat. Authorities found 194 packets of heroin worth a fortune of USD $137 million. The six-member Pakistani crew were coordinating with 12 Indian nationals who were acting as couriers. This isn’t the only recent incident of major maritime trafficking activity between Pakistan and India.

In March 2019, 100 kg of heroin was seized off the Porbandar coast in Gujarat. In this case, nine Iranian nationals were involved in the trafficking attempt.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not seem to have impacted maritime trafficking to India. From March 2020 to March 2021, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) recovered 1.6 tons of narcotics originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, worth about USD $6.74 billion.655 Despite the predominance of cross-border land trafficking to India, maritime trafficking seems to be a substantial threat. Once in India, traffickers can follow a multitude of pathways.

Couriers will often travel to a safe house in a nearby border town to repackage the consignment. They are usually separated into packets with a gram of chitta each. Some of the packets are distributed to local dealers for individual sales and others are separated out to be trafficked to major cities, like Amritsar or Ludhiana.

The indentured addicts are often used for this task, as well as migrant labourers or farmers who are financially insecure. Heroin that is trafficked through India is often found throughout East and Southeast Asia, West Africa, and North America.

The US and Canada are often recipients of heroin trafficked from India by plane. Heroin that is trafficked from India to East and Southeast Asia is usually sent by mail. This is significant, in that trafficking from neighbouring Pakistan to East and Southeast Asia is usually conducted via maritime route, which suggests Indian maritime security is preventing trafficking by sea and leading traffickers to take alternative approaches.

Opiates that are trafficked through India often make their way onto Bangladesh. In 2013, Indian authorities uncovered 60 trafficking attempts in West Bengal, which borders Bangladesh. This tracks with data from Bangladeshi authorities who have confirmed a rise in heroin cases in recent years. Bangladesh in turn has a growing problem of drug addiction, especially in the capital city of Dhaka, which has 2.5 million drug users alone.

Trafficking from India to Bangladesh not only occurs along the western border near the plains, but also along the eastern border, indicating multiple branches in the route. It is unknown whether this heroin is that which is produced locally in India, or trafficked from Afghanistan through India.657 Sri Lanka has become a more significant leg in the southern route, often as a waypoint to Europe.

However, the local consumption market has grown as well. In a study done from 2008- 2012, Sri Lankan authorities estimate there are 45,000 active heroin users a day in the country. The price is also much higher than in neighbouring India, which could mean increasing demand, which will attract more traffickers in the future.

Most heroin in Sri Lanka is trafficked via Pakistan, with 90% seizures originated from there. A number of seizure cases took place at the Karachi seaport. The other prominent country of origin is India, and, like with Bangladesh, it is unknown whether this heroin is cultivated in India or Afghanistan. Trafficking usually occurs by fishing boats from the Rameswaram coast in India to the western coast of Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department (CID) observed trafficking in the opposite direction as well. Perhaps this was to traffic weapons, given intelligence from the DEA that ties Sri Lankan traffickers to a Pakistani network that provides weapons for militants in Punjab and Kashmir.

This is supported by another case study on March 30, 2021. The Indian Coast Guard apprehended three Sri Lankan fishing vessels carrying 300 kg of high-grade heroin, worth USD $4.13 billion. Authorities also found on board the ships a sizable number of AK-47s with thousands of rounds of ammunition.

It is likely this cell was a part of a major DTO trading in weapons and heroin, possibly with militant and/or terrorist groups. Given the importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to geo-politics and international security, there have been calls for security presence by the United States in the region. In an interview with an official from the US 655 Interview with Indian Coast Guard official, Mar. 30, 2021. 656 UNODC, Southern Route, 69-70. 657 “UNODC, Southern Route, 71. 658 Interview with Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department (CID) official, Jan. 29, 2021.

Interview with US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) official, Apr. 1, 2021. 660 Interview with Indian Coast Guard official, Mar. 30, 2021. 116 Indo-Pacific Command, they highlighted the limited capacity that India has to secure the region on their own.

They recommended an Indian Ocean deployment from the United States to assist regional maritime forces and build regional capacity.661 A common maritime trafficking method involves larger shipping vessels carrying substantial consignments anchoring far from the coastline where customs agents and security vessels aren’t likely to patrol.

They then rendezvous with a number of smaller boats who will each take a piece of the consignment and fan out to multiple destinations along the shore. This ensures that even if authorities apprehend one of the boats, only a portion of the consignment is seized.

Many of these vessels will also carry the consignment directly to other transit point countries along the route, including the Maldives, Indonesia, and Australia.663 Some recent major interdiction efforts show the potential growth of this market. On April 10, 2020, four Pakistanis and two Iranians were arrested off their boat by the Sri Lankan Navy for attempting to traffic 280 kg of heroin and 45 kg of methamphetamines onto the island nation.

The nationality of the traffickers showcases the cooperation between traffickers from multiple countries along the route, and could indicate a nexus between multiple drug trafficking organisations. Another similar incident occurred less than two weeks prior. On April 1, 2020, nine Pakistanis attempted to dock on the southern coast of Sri Lanka with 605 kg of methamphetamines and 579 kg of ketamine.

The heavy involvement of Pakistani cartels trafficking to Sri Lanka in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic may indicate Pakistani ISI support, according to the Sri Lankan Police Narcotics Bureau. This level of trafficking activity while the country is locked down would be difficult to accomplish without some state support.

In recent years, Sri Lanka has seen a bump in methamphetamine trafficking, overtaking the heroin market. On January 4, 2021, the Sri Lankan Navy interdicted a fishing vessel off the coast of Negombo on the west coast of Sri Lanka that carried over 100 kg of crystal methamphetamine and 80 kg of hashish, worth a total of USD $3.2 million.

The consignments were concealed within several sacks stored in plastic containers. Just days earlier, they seized another consignment of methamphetamines off the coast of Dodanduwa, which is situated south of Negombo.666 It has also been confirmed that the new organic meth alternative that originates in Afghanistan has made its way to Sri Lanka from India, although it is unclear how much of the meth entering the country is the organic strain.

There is also evidence of high-grade methamphetamines being produced in labs in Pakistan.667 The Sri Lankan Police Narcotics Bureau report that these trafficking incidents are becoming more frequent, while the value of the narcotics is rising simultaneously.

It appears even the global pandemic did not slow down trafficking efforts along parts of the southern route. Like South Asia, the massive and quickly growing populations in East and Southeast Asia (ESEA) present an attractive market to narcotics traffickers. While the region traditionally was supplied by Myanmar for opiates, the southern route has been gaining a foothold in recent years. Given Myanma