Maana halisi ya utekelezaji wa dira ya maendeleo ya taifa kwa wakati sahihi.

[Mto Songwe]

Ili dira ya maendeleo ya Taifa iwe reality inahitajika.
i, Competent leaders
ii, Kuwa makini wakati wote
iii, Kufanya kazi kwa bidii sana
iv, Wote kuwa na lengo moja katika siasa za nchi( muhimu kuepusha migawanyiko )
V, Visionary leaders
vi, Good political system iwe kwa single party au multiparty
Vii, kuenda na muda( ni muhimu kuhakikisha mipango inakamilika ndani ya muda hitajika ikiwa kabla ni vyema zaidi sio miradi kuvuka kipindi cha muda hitajika )

Jambo la msingi zaidi tujiepushe na kuongea ongea sana kusiko na tija we should do more and engage less in empty talk.

=====

High-speed rail in China
The high-speed rail (HSR) network in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the world's lonest and most extensively used – with a total length of 45,000 kilometres (28,000 mi) by the end of 2023.

The HSR network encompasses newly built rail lines with a design speed of 200–380 km/h (120–240 mph).China's HSR accounts for two-thirds of the world's total high-speed railway networks.

Almost all HSR trains, track and service are owned and operated by the China Railway Corporation under the brand China Railway High-speed (CRH).
High-speed rail in China

Chinese designed Fuxing train in Beijing

A CRH2A (based on E2-1000 Series Shinkansen) in Xiamen

A CRH5 train-set in Shahe, Beijing, which is derived from the Alstom ETR600.

Chinese designed CRH380A train at Shanghai Hongqiao railway station.

The Shanghai Maglev, which uses German Transrapid technology to connect Pudong Airport with the city
High-speed rail developed rapidly in China since the mid-2000s.

CRH was introduced in April 2007 and the Beijing-Tianjin intercity rail, which opened in August 2008, was the first passenger dedicated HSR line. Currently, the HSR extends to all provincial-level administrative divisions and Hong Kong SAR with the exception of Macau SAR.

Notable HSR lines in China include the Beijing–Kunming high-speed railway which at 2,760 km (1,710 mi) is the world's longest HSR line in operation, and the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway with the world's fastest operating conventional train services.

The Shanghai Maglev is the world's first high-speed commercial magnetic levitation ("maglev") line that reach a top speed of 431 km/h (268 mph).

The economics of high-speed rail in China has been a topic of much discussion.

A 2019 study produced by TransFORM, a knowledge platform developed by the World Bank and China’s Ministry of Transport, estimated the annual rate of economic return of China's high-speed rail network in 2015, to be at 8 percent, which is well above the opportunity cost of capital in China for major long term infrastructure investments.

The study also noted a range of benefits which included shortened travel times, improved safety and better facilitation of tourism, labor and mobility, as well as reducing highway congestion, accidents and greenhouse emissions as some automobile travellers switch from car use to rail.

A 2020 study by Paulson Institute has estimated the net benefit of the high-speed rail system to be approximately $378 billion, with an annual return on investment of 6.5%.

 

[Detective J]

View attachment 3017777View attachment 3017778View attachment 3017779

High-speed rail in China
The high-speed rail (HSR) network in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the world's lonest and most extensively used – with a total length of 45,000 kilometres (28,000 mi) by the end of 2023.

The HSR network encompasses newly built rail lines with a design speed of 200–380 km/h (120–240 mph).China's HSR accounts for two-thirds of the world's total high-speed railway networks.

Almost all HSR trains, track and service are owned and operated by the China Railway Corporation under the brand China Railway High-speed (CRH).
High-speed rail in China

Chinese designed Fuxing train in Beijing

A CRH2A (based on E2-1000 Series Shinkansen) in Xiamen

A CRH5 train-set in Shahe, Beijing, which is derived from the Alstom ETR600.

Chinese designed CRH380A train at Shanghai Hongqiao railway station.

The Shanghai Maglev, which uses German Transrapid technology to connect Pudong Airport with the city
High-speed rail developed rapidly in China since the mid-2000s.

CRH was introduced in April 2007 and the Beijing-Tianjin intercity rail, which opened in August 2008, was the first passenger dedicated HSR line. Currently, the HSR extends to all provincial-level administrative divisions and Hong Kong SAR with the exception of Macau SAR.

Notable HSR lines in China include the Beijing–Kunming high-speed railway which at 2,760 km (1,710 mi) is the world's longest HSR line in operation, and the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway with the world's fastest operating conventional train services.

The Shanghai Maglev is the world's first high-speed commercial magnetic levitation ("maglev") line that reach a top speed of 431 km/h (268 mph).

The economics of high-speed rail in China has been a topic of much discussion.

A 2019 study produced by TransFORM, a knowledge platform developed by the World Bank and China’s Ministry of Transport, estimated the annual rate of economic return of China's high-speed rail network in 2015, to be at 8 percent, which is well above the opportunity cost of capital in China for major long term infrastructure investments. The study also noted a range of benefits which included shortened travel times, improved safety and better facilitation of tourism, labor and mobility, as well as reducing highway congestion, accidents and greenhouse emissions as some automobile travellers switch from car use to rail.

A 2020 study by Paulson Institute has estimated the net benefit of the high-speed rail system to be approximately $378 billion, with an annual return on investment of 6.5%.

Ili dira ya maendeleo ya taifa iwe reality ina hitajika.
i, Competent leaders
ii, Kuwa makini wakati wote
iii, Kufanya kazi kwa bidii sana
iv, Wote kuwa na lengo moja katika siasa za nchi( muhimu kuepusha migawanyiko )
V, Visionary leaders
vi, Good political system iwe kwa single party au multiparty

Jambo la msingi zaidi tujiepushe na kuongea ongea sana kusiko na tija we should do more and engage less in empty talk.

Hatuna mifumo inayotuletea competet leadears, tunabahatisha tu (akija competent saw, asipokuwa competet sawa) . Tutengeneze mifumo dhabiti ya kuzalisha viongozi

 

[Mbaga Jr]

Bongo ungekuta hapo kuna watu wamenunua nchi nyngn kutokana na 10% za hy miradi ya China.

 

[Mto Songwe]

Hatuna mifumo inayotuletea competet leadears, tunabahatisha tu (akija competent saw, asipokuwa competet sawa) . Tutengeneze mifumo dhabiti ya kuzalisha viongozi

Ni kweli mifumo dhabiti inahitaji sana ndani ya nchi hasa tukianza na ndani ya vyama mahali ambapo viongozi wana zalishwa.

 

[Mto Songwe]

Bongo ungekuta hapo kuna watu wamenunua nchi nyngn kutokana na 10% za hy miradi ya China.

Hatari sana upigaji kila kona.

Hata ucheleweshwaji wa miradi kwa wakati tuna fail sana.

 

[Mto Songwe]

Kuna kitu cha kujifunza hapa kabla ya kuanza utekelezaji wetu.

DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT.
China's high-speed rail expansion is entirely managed, planned and financed by the Chinese government.

Over 85% of track on the Beijing–Tianjin intercity railway is laid on viaducts. Chinese builders use elevated lines to keep high-speed rail tracks straight and level over uneven terrain, and to save on land acquisition costs.

Public interest, safety, and concern​

On one hand, the demand of high-speed rail in China steadily increases over time. In 2012, the average occupancy rate of high-speed rails in China was 57%. This percentage increased to 65%, 69% and 72% in the year of 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. As of February 2016, high-speed rails covered nearly 20,000 km (12,427 mi).

On the other hand, however, public concerns about the high-speed rail development have been raised from various perspectives.
The safety issue that drew the attention of the public and the government was the Wenzhou train collision which happened on July 23, 2011, in which 40 people died, 172 were injured, and 54 related officials blamed and punished. According to a 2014 World Bank report, the incident was attributed to inadequate testing of a new design for signaling equipment, which lacked proper fail-safe features. Outside of this major accident in 2011, Chinese HSR provides "world-class" quality of service and comfort, and carries a large volume of passengers safely.

However overall, Chinese high speed rail has an exemplary safety record and according to The New York Times, the Chinese high-speed rail network is "one of the world’s safest transportation systems."

As of at least 2024, the Wenzhou crash remains the only serious accident in the massive Chinese HSR network.

Construction costs​

According to a 2019 World Bank report, China was able to have construction costs of its high speed rail to be at an average of $17 million to 21 million dollars per km, which is lower than other countries by a third.

Standardization of the designs and procedures were cited as the key reason for keeping costs down.

Economic efficiency​

Experts expressed concern of the network's operational efficiency.

In 2016, Chinese railways carried almost 2 trillion ton-kilometers of freight and over 1 billion passenger-kilometer of passengers, making it one of the world's most intensively used freight and passenger railway networks in the world. However, the rail staff productivity upon railway track infrastructure index in China is less than 0.05, being the lowest among the countries with significant railway construction.The government also articulated the importance and urgency of assuring the capacity of railway staff, especially their familiarity with telecommunication and signaling testing in the official investigation of the Wenzhou train collision. In addition, it is hard to identify problems in the construction process, given the distribution resource planning system needed for rapid railway building and assembling. Suppliers and manufacturers blame each other for any problem detected in the trial operation, while tracking the construction process to every single detail is an almost impossible job for inspectors.
A prefabricated section of the elevated track being installed on the Harbin–Dalian High Speed Railway in October 2010

Policy justifications​

Critics both in China and abroad have questioned the necessity of having an expensive high-speed rail system in a largely developing country, where most workers cannot afford to pay a premium for faster travel. The government has justified the expensive undertaking as promoting a number of policy objectives. HSR provides fast, reliable and comfortable means of transporting large numbers of travelers in a densely populated country over long distances, which:

• Improves economic productivity and competitiveness over the long term by increasing the transport capacity of railways and linking labor markets. Dedicating passenger transport to high-speed lines frees up older conventional railways to freights, which can now carry more payload at lower speed and is more profitable for railway companies than passengers, whose fares are subsidized.
• Stimulates the economy in the short term as HSR construction creates jobs and drives up demand for construction, steel and cement industries during the economic downturn. Work on the Beijing–Shanghai HSR mobilized 110,000 workers.
• Facilitates cross-city economic integration and promotes the growth of second-tier cities. The introduction of the high-speed railways is responsible for 59% of the increase in market potential for the secondary cities connected by bullet trains. (Market potential, a concept used by economic geographers, measures "a geographic area's access to markets for inputs and outputs.") A 10% increase in a secondary city's market potential is expected to be associated with a 4.5% increase in its average real estate price.
• Supports energy independence and environmental sustainability. Electric trains use less energy to transport people and goods on a per unit basis and can draw power from more diverse sources of energy including renewables than automobile and aircraft, which are more reliant on imported petroleum.
• Develop an indigenous high-speed rail equipment industry. The expansion into HSR is also developing China into a leading source of high-speed rail building technology. Chinese train-makers have absorbed imported technologies quickly, localized production processes, and even begun to compete with foreign suppliers in the export market. Six years after receiving Kawasaki's license to produce Shinkansen E2, CSC Sifang can produce the CRH2A without Japanese input, and Kawasaki has ended cooperation with Sifang on high-speed rail.

Profitability and debt​

Traffic density and market share of conventional and high-speed rail on major corridors from 2001 to 2013
One major concern of the high-speed rail network is the high amount of debt incurred. As of 2022, the China State Railway Group has had a debt of around US$900 billion, according to Nikkei.[10] Conservative scholars and officials are worried that the indebted high-speed rail is further exacerbated by its unprofitability, operating at a daily loss of US$24 million as of November 2021. While a number of high-speed railways in eastern China have started to be operationally profitable since 2015, the high speed railways in the midwest still operate at a loss. Zhengzhou–Xi'an high-speed railway is estimated to run 59 trains in 2010 and 125 trains in 2018, yet in 2016 there are merely around 30 trains on operation, causing a 1.4 billion loss. The Guiyang–Guangzhou high-speed railway and Lanzhou–Xinjiang high-speed railway (where fares do not cover electricity costs) are both suffering from high maintenance cost due to harsh climate conditions and complicated terrain structure. The Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway is one of the few lines that have been profitable, with profits steadily increasing after first breaking even in 2014, and achieving revenue of CNY 29.6 billion and net profit of CNY 12.7 billion in 2017. In an analysis conducted in 2019, only five out of fifteen high speed railway lines with travel speeds reaching 350 kilometers per hour, were able to cover all costs that included both the operating and capital costs.

Construction financing​

China's high-speed rail construction projects are highly capital intensive. About 40–50% of financing is provided by the national government through lending by state owned banks and financial institutions, another 40% by the bonds issued by the Ministry of Railway (MOR) and the remaining 10–20% by provincial and local governments. The MOR, through its financing arm, the China Rail Investment Corp (CRIC), issued an estimated ¥1 trillion (US$150 billion in 2010 dollars) in debt to finance HSR construction from 2006 to 2010, including ¥310 billion in the first 10 months of 2010. CRIC has also raised some capital through equity offerings; in the spring of 2010, CRIC sold a 4.5 percent stake in the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway to the Bank of China for ¥6.6 billion and a 4.5 percent stake to the public for ¥6 billion. CRIC retained 56.2 percent ownership on that line. As of 2010, the CRIC-bonds are considered to be relatively safe investments because they are backed by assets (the railways) and implicitly by the government.

Table:Construction cost of HSR lines in operation.

Line Length (km) Designed Speed (km/h) Total const. cost (¥ billion) Unit cost (¥ million/km) Ref. Qinshen PDL (Qinhuangdao-Shenyang) 404 250 15.7 38.9 [154] Hening PFL (Hefei-Nanjing) 166 250 25 150.6 [155] Jiaoji PDL (Qingdao-Jinan) 364 250 11 30.21 [156] Shitai PDL (Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan) 190 250 17.075 89.87 [157] Hewu PFL (Hefei-Wuhan) 351 250 16.8 47.86 [158] Yongtaiwen PFL (Ningbo-Taizhou-Wenzhou) 268 250 16.28 60.75 [159] Wenfu PFL (Wenzhou-Fuzhou) 298 250 18 60.4 [160] Fuxia PFL (Fuzhou-Xiamen) 275 250 15.259 55.49 [161] Chengguan PDL (Chengdu-Guanxian) 65 250 13.3 204.62 [162] Changjiu ICL (Nanchang-Jiujiang) 131 250 5.832 44.52 [163] Changji ICL (Changchun-Jilin) 111 250 9.6 86.49 [164] Hainan ER ICL (Haikou-Sanya) 308 250 20.2 65.58 [165] Jingjin ICL (Beijing-Tianjin) 115 350 21.5 186.96 [166] Wuguang PDL (Wuhan-Changsha-Guangzhou) 968 350 116.6 120 [167] Zhengxi PDL (Zhengzhou-Xi'an) 455 350 35.31 77.6 [168] Huning HSR (Shanghai-Nanjing) 301 350 50 166.11 [169] Huhang PDL (Shanghai-Hangzhou) 150 350 29.29 195.27 [170] Jinghu HSR (Beijing–Shanghai) 1318 380 220.9 167.6 [171]

Shangrao railway station with a 380BL train serving the Hefei–Fuzhou HSR on the upper platforms and a 380A train serving the Hangzhou–Changsha HSR in the lower platform. Workers on the Shenzhen section of Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong high-speed railway in May 2011
Large construction debt-loads require significant revenues from rider fares, subsidies, and/or other sources of income, such as advertising, to repay. Despite impressive ridership figures, virtually every completed line has incurred losses in its first years of operation. For example, the Beijing–Tianjin intercity railway in its two full years of operation, delivered over 41 million rides. The line cost ¥20.42 billion to build, and ¥1.8 billion per annum to operate, including ¥0.6 billion in interest payments on its ¥10 billion of loan obligations. The terms of the loans range from 5–10 years at interest rates of 6.3 to 6.8 percent. In its first year of operation from August 1, 2008, to July 31, 2009, the line carried 18.7 million riders and generated ¥1.1 billion in revenues, which resulted in a loss of ¥0.7 billion. In the second year, ridership rose to 22.3 million and revenues improved to ¥1.4 billion, which narrowed losses somewhat to below ¥0.5 billion. To break even, the line must deliver 30 million rides annually. To be able to repay principal, ridership would need to exceed 40 million. In September 2010, daily ridership averaged 69,000 or an annual rate of 25.2 million. In 2013, ridership totaled 25.85 million. The line has a capacity of delivering 100 million rides annually and initial estimated repayment period of 16 years. In 2012, the Beijing–Tianjin Intercity Railway reported that it had broken even, and by 2015 was operating at a profit.
The Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan PDL lost ¥0.8 billion in its first year and is set to lose ¥0.9 billion in 2010. The Southeast HSR corridor lost ¥0.377 billion in its first year beginning August 2009. The Zhengzhou-Xian HSR since opening in February 2010 was expected to generate revenues of ¥0.6 billion in its first full year but must make interest payments of ¥1.1 billion. In the first three quarters of 2012, the line lost ¥1.87 billion. The losses must be covered by the operator, which is usually subsidized by local governments. In December 2014, the Henan provincial government imposed a rule requiring municipal authorities pay 70% of the deficit incurred by Henan's intercity lines with the provincial authorities paying the remainder 30%.
The MOR faces a debt-repayment peak in 2014. Some economists recommend further subsidies to lower fares and boost ridership and ultimately revenues. Others warn that the financing side of the existing construction and operation model is unsustainable. If the rail-backed loans cannot be fully repaid, they may be refinanced or the banks may seize ownership of the railways. To prevent that eventuality, the MOR is trying to improve management of its rapidly growing HSR holdings.
Overall, ridership is growing as the high-speed rail network continues to expand. High-speed rail is also becoming relatively more affordable as fares have remained stable while worker wages have grown sharply over the same period. In 2016, the high-speed rail revenue was 140.9 billion RMB Yuan (US$20 billion), while the same term interest from at least 3300 billion debt of its construction was 156.8 billion RMB Yuan (US$22.4 billion). According to the World Bank, a stable long term planning and standardization of technology and design used in the high-speed rail helps to reduce financial and operational cost. Standardization of designs and procedures such as train tracks, rolling stocks, signal systems keeps the construction cost down. Moreover, State-owned corporation also uses bulk purchasing to reduce material prices.

Fare cost comparisons​

The CRH5 intercity train on the Changchun–Jilin Intercity railway.
In 2013 fares for China's high-speed rail service costs significantly less than similar systems in other developed countries, for comparison high speed rail tickets in France or Germany cost slightly over US$0.10 per kilometer and the various Shinkansen services hover above US$0.20 per kilometer. A 2019 study by the World Bank Group, had found that the HSR fares in China are low when compared to other countries and have attracted passengers from all income levels. They noted that HSR is "very competitive" with bus and aircraft transport for distances between 150 km and 800 km (about 3 to 4 hours travel time). Additionally due to the frequency and its high speeds, HSR services that travel at 350kph, still remains competitive with other modes of transport, for distances of up to 1,200 km.

Trip	Distance	Price	Price US$/km	Time
HSR trip from Beijing to Jinan	419 km (260 mi)	CNY185 (US$30)	0.07	1 hour 22 minutes
HSR trip from Paris to Lyon	428 km (266 mi)	CNY240 (US$39)	0.10	2 hours
HSR trip from Madrid to Valencia, Spain	391 km (243 mi)	€33–58 (US$41–72)	0.11–0.18	1 hour 40 minutes
HSR train from Tokyo to Gifu-Hashima	396 km (246 mi)	CNY270 (US$43)	0.11	1 hour 56 minutes

Impact on airlines​

The spread of high-speed rail has forced domestic airlines in China to slash airfare and cancel regional flights. The impact of high-speed rail on air travel is most acute for intercity trips under 500 km (310 mi). By the spring of 2011, commercial airline service had been completely halted on previously popular routes such as Wuhan–Nanjing, Wuhan–Nanchang, Xi’an–Zhengzhou and Chengdu–Chongqing.Flights on routes over 1,500 km (930 mi) are generally unaffected.As of October 2013, high-speed rail was carrying twice as many passengers each month as the country's airlines.